CHRISTOPHER NELSON, APPELLANT,
v.
GLORIA NELSON, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage appeal, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of permanent alimony to the former wife, invalidation of an antenuptial agreement, and valuation of marital assets. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent alimony despite the marriage falling in a 'gray area' between short and long-term marriages, where disparate earning capacity becomes a significant factor.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent periodic alimony based on the disparity in earning capacity and the statutory factors in section 61.08(2). The trial court's failure to set forth specific findings regarding the legal basis for invalidating the antenuptial agreement was harmless error given the undisputed evidence. The trial court properly valued the marital assets, as it was only required to value 'significant assets' and may presume assets are not significant when evidence of value is not presented.
[1] In marriages of intermediate duration, disparate earning capacity is a significant factor in determining the appropriateness of permanent or temporary alimony.
[2] A trial court's failure to make express findings regarding the legal basis for invalidating an antenuptial agreement is harmless error when the underlying evidence is lar…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In these [gray area] marriages, a disparate earning capacity becomes a 'significant factor' in deciding whether permanent or temporary support is appropriate.”
Establishes the legal standard for alimony awards in marriages of intermediate length, making earning capacity disparity central to the analysis.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for twelve and one-half years. The former husband earns over $72,000 annually, while the trial court imputed an annual income…
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BRYAN, Ben L., Associate Judge.
This appeal results from a dissolution of marriage granted November 7, 1997. We affirm the amended final judgment of dissolution in all respects. We write to address three of the former husband’s points on appeal which concern the award of permanent alimony, the invalidation of the parties’ ante-nuptial agreement, and the valuation of certain marital assets.
The parties were married twelve and one-half years. This marriage falls within the “gray area” between short-term and long-term marriages, where there is no presumption in favor of or against an award of permanent alimony. Burrill v. Burrill, 701 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). In these marriages, a disparate earning capacity becomes a “significant factor” in deciding whether permanent or temporary support is appropriate. Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So. 2d 50, 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Here, the trial court found the former husband earns over $72,000 annually, and imputed an annual income of $12,000 to the former wife.. The trial court examined each of the economic factors contained in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (1995). Based on its findings, the court determined the wife was in need of permanent periodic alimony and the husband possessed the ability to pay. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent periodic alimony in this case.
The second point we address is the trial court’s invalidation of the antenuptial agreement. The antenuptial agreement was dictated by the husband and written by the wife on the day before the parties’ wedding when the wife was one month pregnant. The former husband argues the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in invalidating the agreement, because the court made no express findings regarding its legal basis for invalidating the agreement. See Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla.1987). Our review of the record reveals the evidence on this issue was largely undisputed. Thus, we conclude the trial court’s failure to set forth specific findings was harmless.
Finally, the husband alleges error in the trial court’s valuation of certain assets, contending the record lacks competent substantial evidence to support the court’s valuation. We take this opportunity to reiterate that section 61.075(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) requires the valuation of only “significant assets,” as we noted in Bomwell v. Bomwell, 676 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). “When the parties fail to present evidence as to the value of an asset, the trial court may presume that the asset is not of significant value, and there is no error in failing to include it in the equitable distribution scheme.” Id. The assets about which the former husband complains are either of little value, or the difference between the value assigned by the court and the evidence of the asset’s value admitted at trial is not sufficient to warrant reversal of the entire equitable distribution scheme.
AFFIRMED.
WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (13 total)
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Stephany M. Byers v. Byers, 910 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…tandard the parties enjoyed during the marriage. See id. The disparate earning power of the parties is, therefore, a signifi [*344] cant factor in determining whether permanent or temporary support is appropriate. See id.; see also Nelson v. Nelson, 721 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). In situations where the superior earning power of one spouse is achieved during a period when the other spouse is out of the job market as a result of an agreement that the nonworking spouse will care for the children, the…
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Walker v. Walker, 818 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…f the petition for dissolution, the marriage lasted twelve years. Its duration falls within the gray area between short-term and long-term marriages, and there is no presumption in favor of or against an award of permanent alimony. Nelson v. Nelson, 721 So. 2d 388, 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 668 So. 2d 245, 248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). A significant factor in determining whether permanent or temporary support is appropriate is a disparate earning capacity between the spouses. Nelson, 721 So. 2…
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Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…little or no pay and, part time, until 1995 and thereafter devoting herself to caring for the parties' child, school and homemaking. .§ 61.075(1) and (8), Fla. Stat. . See Martinez v. Martinez, 761 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Nelson v. Nelson, 721 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Lynch v. Lynch, 695 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Parker v. Parker, 655 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). See also Abrams, I Fla. Family Law, Ch. 31.05(2)(c). . See Calderon v. Calderon, 730 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Ingle…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987)
- Ogden Aviation Servs. & Alexsis, Inc. v. Khalid DAR, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Burrill v. Burrill, 701 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Sturdivan v. State, 676 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Bomwell v. Bomwell, 676 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)