THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
IN THE INTEREST OF M.A.D., A CHILD, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a suppression order in a juvenile delinquency case, holding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a youth who had been previously warned not to congregate at a store location, and that the subsequent search of the youth's backpack was valid as a search incident to arrest based on probable cause of trespass.
The court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion of trespass to stop and detain M.A.D., and probable cause to arrest him for trespass, justifying the search of the backpack as a search incident to arrest. The court further held that a search incident to arrest may precede the formal arrest as long as probable cause existed prior to the search.
[1] A police officer has a well-founded suspicion to stop and detain an individual when the individual has previously been warned by both police and property management not t…
[2] A search incident to an arrest may precede the formal arrest if probable cause for the arrest existed prior to the search.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where as here, M.A.D. was identified by the police as someone which both the police and the store's management had warned on previous occasions not to congregate in front of the store, the police officer certainly had a well founded suspicion that M.A.D. was committing a trespass in his presence on the date in question.”
Establishes the legal standard for reasonable suspicion based on prior warnings and identification of the youth at a location known for gang activity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Slayton spotted M.A.D. standing in front of a Winn-Dixie supermarket on November 7, 1997. The officer had previously warned M.A.D., along with…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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GREEN, J.
This is an appeal from" an order granting a motion to suppress evidence filed on behalf of the appellee, M.A.D., in a delinquency proceeding. We reverse.
While on patrol on November 7,1997, Officer Harold Slayton spotted M.A.D. standing in front of a Winn-Dixie supermarket with another individual. Officer Slayton recognized M.A.D. as one of many youths which he and the store’s management had warned on several prior occasions not to “hang out” or trespass in front of the store. According to the officer’s testimony, this area was a hot spot for gang activity and the store’s management had complained to the police that the large congregation of youths in front of the store was frightening away the store’s customers. When Officer Slayton approached M.A.D., he was holding a backpack in his arms. When the officer asked M.A.D. about the contents of the backpack, the officer testified that M.A.D. voluntarily consented to a search. The officer admitted that prior to the search, he had not decided whether to arrest M.A.D. for trespass after warning. The officer’s search of M.A.D.’s bag yielded the presence of a small amount of marijuana. M.A.D. was thereafter arrested and charged in a petition for delinquency with one count of possession of cannabis in violation of section 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes (1997).
M.A.D. moved to suppress the cannabis in the proceedings below on the grounds that it was the fruit of an unlawful stop. The lower court agreed and granted the motion. The state argues, and we agree, that this was error. Where as here, M.A.D. was identified by the police as someone which both the police and the store’s management had warned on previous occasions not to congregate in front of the store, the police officer certainly had a well founded suspicion that M.A.D. was committing a trespass1 in his presence on the date in question. The officer was therefore justified in stopped and detaining M.A.D. See Thames v. State, 592 So. 2d 733, 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); State v. Pye, 551 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); see also Robinson v. State, 551 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Because the officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest M.A.D. for the misdemeanor crime of trespass, the officer was further justified in searching the backpack which was within M.A.D.’s immediate control as incident to arrest.2 See Gay v. State, 607 So. 2d 454, 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); T.M. v. State, 570 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); State v. King, 405 So. 2d 770, 773 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). As the state correctly points out, it is of no moment that the officer conducted the search of the bag prior to placing M.A.D. under arrest. See State v. Russell, 659 So. 2d 465, 469 n. 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“It is well settled that a search incident to an arrest may precede the formal arrest as long as probable cause existed prior to the search.”); State v. Joseph, 593 So. 2d 594, 595-96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that evidence of pre-arrest search admissible where probable cause existed for the arrest).
Thus, for all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order granting the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings in this cause.
Reversed.
. The trespass statutes provide in relevant part that: ’
810.08 Trespass in structure or conveyance
(1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters or remains in any structure or conveyance, or, having heen authorized, licensed, or invited, is warned by the owner or lessee of the premises, or by a person authorized by the owner or lessee, to depart and refuses to do so, commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance.
810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance
(l)(a) A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance:
1. As to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011;
commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.
§§ 810.08, .09, Fla. Stat. (1997)
. Our conclusion that the search was valid as incident to an arrest necessarily moots out M.A.D.’s further argument that the search was nonconsensual.
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State v. Whitley, 846 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…plete with examples oí cases that adopt the general principle that a pre-arrest search is considered incidental to a lawful arrest if the officer had probable cause to make the arrest at the time the search was conducted. See, e.g., State v. M.A.D., 721 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); State v. Hernandez, 706 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Russell, 659 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 665 So. 2d 220 (Fla.1995); Butler v. State, 634 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), quashed on other grounds, 655 So…
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Smith v. State, 778 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…specifically address the revocation of an invitation. But in cases we have discovered involving trespass in quasi-public business parking lots, the property owners or the police actually told the interlopers they were unwelcome. See State v. M.A.D., 721 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (stating that suspect had been warned by supermarket employees and the police not to “hang out” in front of the store); Melton v. State, 546 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (explaining that bar manager had banned the customer from…
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Simeon Williams v. State, 910 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…kept on file with the police, had founded suspicion to stop suspect who they observed in the parking lot after the business was closed, where "No trespassing” signs were posted, and suspect ran upon being approached by the police); State v. M.A.D., 721 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(where police officer recognized juvenile as someone whom police and store’s management had warned on previous occasions not to congregate in front of store, police had founded suspicion sufficient to justify investigatory stop of…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. PYE, 551 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- State v. Russell, 659 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Robinson v. State, 551 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- GAY v. State, 607 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Shenker v. Shenker, 405 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. Joseph, 593 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Thames v. State, 592 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Herrera v. State, 570 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- T.M. v. State, 570 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)