RODOLFO DELACRUZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Rodolfo Delacruz appealed the denial of his postconviction Rule 3.850 motion challenging his guilty plea for DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident. The appellate court affirmed most of the trial court's rulings but reversed and remanded one claim regarding counsel's alleged misadvice about the maximum sentence exposure.
The court held that Delacruz's plea was involuntary because he was misinformed about his actual maximum sentence exposure under the sentencing guidelines. Counsel's reference to the statutory maximum without explaining the guidelines painted an unrealistic picture of the defendant's true exposure, and without accurate understanding of the guidelines recommendation, the plea cannot be considered voluntary.
[1] A guilty plea is involuntary if the defendant was misinformed by counsel about the maximum penalty they faced.
[2] Advice from counsel referencing only the statutory maximum penalty, without explaining the sentencing guidelines, can render a guilty plea involuntary.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A reference by counsel to the statutory maximum without an explanation of the guidelines paints an unrealistic picture of the true exposure a defendant confronts.”
Establishes the core principle that counsel must explain sentencing guidelines, not just statutory maximums, when advising defendants about potential penalties.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDelacruz pleaded guilty to two second-degree felonies: DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident involving serious injury or death. He was…
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PER CURIAM.
Rodolfo Delacruz appeals the denial of his postconviction motion filed pursuant to Flori-da Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Delacruz’s motion raised numerous grounds attacking his conviction, following a guilty plea, for DUI manslaughter and for leaving the scene of an accident involving serious injury or death. He was sentenced to seventeen years in prison followed by three years’ probation. We agree with the trial court’s disposition of all but one of these claims, and affirm the trial court’s order except as set forth in this opinion.
In arguing that his plea was involuntary, Delacruz alleged that he was misinformed by his trial counsel as to the maximum penalty he faced if he proceeded to trial and was found guilty. He maintains that his counsel told him he could receive a prison term of twenty-five to thirty years if convicted of both counts. He alleges that this advice was erroneous and that had he known his actual maximum potential penalty, he would not have entered a guilty plea.
A review of the portions of the record provided to us shows that if Delacruz was advised as he alleges, he was indeed misinformed. It is true that Delacruz was charged with two second-degree felonies, and, absent the guidelines, the most severe prison sanction he could receive was thirty years. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). However, according to the guidelines, Delacruz could receive no more than nineteen years’ imprisonment absent a valid departure sentence. There is nothing in the record before us which indicates a departure sentence would be warranted. Therefore, the most severe prison sanction Delacruz could have received may well have been six to eleven years less than what he was allegedly told he could receive. A reference by counsel to the statutory maximum without an explanation of the guidelines paints an unrealistic picture of the true exposure a defendant confronts. See Johnson v. State, 523 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that counsel’s misadvice concerning a guidelines’ recommended range rendered defendant’s plea involuntary given the considerable presumption that such a guideline recommendation is the appropriate sentence to be imposed). Since it appears that Delacruz did not have an accurate understanding of the guidelines recommendation, we cannot consider his plea voluntary.
There is nothing in the trial court’s order or record attachments which rebuts Delacruz’s claim that he was misinformed as to the maximum sentence he was likely to receive if he were found guilty. Therefore, we must remand this cause for further consideration of this claim. See Choi v. State, 692 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA1997).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FRANK, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.
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Harrell v. State, 21 So. 3d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…es not conclusively refute the allegation that counsel affirmatively misad- [*169] vised Harrell that he was facing life in prison if he went to trial, we reverse the denial of this claim and remand for an evidentiary hearing. See Delacruz v. State, 721 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (reversing denial of claim that appellant was misinformed by his trial counsel as to the maximum penalty he faced if he proceeded to trial and was found guilty). In Ground Three, Harrell alleged that counsel was ineffective for f…
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Scharf v. State, 799 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…hdraw his pleas. As outlined above, based on the information to which he pleaded, Scharf could have received only one-year jail sentences on counts two through five. Scharf has presented a facially sufficient claim for relief. See Delacruz v. State, 721 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We reverse the trial court’s order. On remand, if the trial court again denies Scharfs claim without an evidentiary hearing, it shall attach those portions of the record that conclusively refute the claim. Reversed and remanded…
Authorities Cited
- Johnson v. State, 523 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Choi v. State, 692 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)