CHARLES D. ALLEN, CHARLES D. BECK, JR., BRUCE J. BERG, SYDNEY C. BOUWER, LEONARD CROWLEY, EILEEN ESCOTO, WALTER N. FRANK, JOHN E. GARWOOD, JOY A. GARWOOD, GARLAND G. GRANT, EVELYN GUITREAU, JEFFREY HAZLE, JUDITH KETTERER, LAWRENCE A LANGE, ELWOOD LIKE, LOIS LIKE, DANIEL C. MEISINGER, LINDA P. NICHOLS, ARTHUR L. O'CONNOR, KENNETH M. RENNEY, PATRICK RILEY, AND LEONARD S. SIEKMEIER, APPELLANTS,
v.
TIC PARTICIPATIONS TRUST, A TEXAS TRUST, D.E. FREY & COMPANY, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, DOMINION CAPITAL CORPORATION, A TEXAS CORPORATION, HARBOUR INVESTMENTS, INC., A WISCONSIN CORPORATION, OAK BROOK SECURITIES CORPORATION, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION, SUNPOINT SECURITIES, INC., A TEXAS CORPORATION, TRIDENT INVESTMENT COMPANY, A TEXAS CORPORATION, AND JAMES FREDERICK GLAZA, APPELLEES
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A cross-appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order that precedes an entirely favorable final judgment.
Appellants' complaint was dismissed, and they appealed. Appellees then filed a cross-appeal from an earlier order denying their motion to dismiss for …
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KLEIN, J.
The trial court dismissed appellants’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on August 27,1998. This appeal is from that order. Appellees subsequently filed a notice of cross-appeal directed to an earlier order rendered on June 25, 1998, denying their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The notice of cross-appeal states that it “is precipitated” by appellants’ appeal of the final order of August 27.
Appellants have moved to dismiss the cross-appeal on the ground that the appellees can only cross-appeal the final order, not the earlier order, arguing that their failure to appeal from the earlier order precludes a cross-appeal at this time. The motion is not well taken.
As Judge Hubbart explained in his concurring opinion in Dauer v. Freed, 444 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), an interlocutory order entered prior to an entirely favorable final judgment may be cross-appealed by the appellee. The order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was such an interlocutory order, and the correctness of it may be raised on a cross-appeal from the final order. The notice of cross-appeal is technically from the final order, but appellees may assert error as to any adverse interlocutory order preceding the entry of the final order. Dauer, 444 So. 2d at 1016.
Although appellees could have taken a non-final appeal from the order denying their motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i), they also had the option of seeking review of that non-final order on appeal from the final order. Rule 9.130(g). Because the final order is entirely favorable to appellees, the cross-appeal, pursuant to rule 9.110(g), is the appropriate method for seeking review of the earlier order. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
WARNER and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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Himmel v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 257 So. 3d 488 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)…sed and remanded. CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. challenge the trial court’s rulings on those motions, it should have filed a crossappeal. Allen v. TIC Participations Tr., 722 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that when a final order is entirely favorable to appellee, a cross-appeal is the appropriate method for seeking review of an earlier non-final order).…
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MacKenzie v. Centex Homes, 208 So. 3d 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…ief from any part of the order.”). A cross appeal is the proper method to seek review of an earlier non-final order when the final [*793] order is entirely favorable to the appellee. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(g),(h); Allen v. TIC Participations Tr., 722 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (denying motion to dismiss cross appeal).3 Regardless of a cross appeal, this Court has an independent obligation to ensure jurisdiction was proper. See Shannon v. Cheney Bros., Inc., 167 So. 3d 397, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…
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State v. Anderson, 215 So. 3d 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…790, 792-93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ("A cross appeal is the proper method to seek review of an earlier non-final order when the final order is entirely favorable to the appellee.” (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(g), (h))); Allen v. TIC Participations Tr., 722 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). As Anderson is arguing for the reversal of the summary denial on Ground Two as an alternative ground to affirm the rest of the order, the tipsy coachman doctrine would not apply. See MacKenzie, 208 So. 3d at 793 n.3.…
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- Maxwell Dauer and Reva B. Dauer v. Freed, 444 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)