DONNIE E. EPLEE, PETITIONER,
v.
CANDICE EPLEE, RESPONDENT
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Donald Eplee sought certiorari review of a trial court order disqualifying his attorney Bill Salmon from representing him in a dissolution of marriage action. The court held that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by disqualifying Salmon based on an alleged prior attorney-client relationship with the opposing party, finding no substantial relationship between the prior representation and the pending dissolution suit.
The court granted the petition and quashed the disqualification order, holding that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law. Disqualification was not warranted because there was no substantial relationship between the matters in the prior representation and the current dissolution proceeding, and respondent failed to demonstrate how the prior advice was substantially related to the dissolution action.
[1] Orders granting or denying motions to disqualify a party's attorney may be reviewed by certiorari.
[2] Before disqualifying an attorney, the former client must show that the matters in the pending suit are substantially related to the matters in the prior representation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Requiring the disqualification of an attorney is ... a matter of no small consequence. Thus, before a client's former attorney will be disqualified from representing a party whose interests are adverse to the former client's, the former client must show that the matters embraced in the pending suit are substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former client.”
Establishes the applicable legal standard for attorney disqualification based on prior representation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSalmon had represented Eplee in a criminal case 16 years earlier. During that representation, Salmon advised Eplee's girlfriend (now respondent) that …
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WOLF, J.
Donald Eplee filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review an order disqualifying his attorney, Bill Salmon, from representing him in a dissolution of marriage action. The issue before us is whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law for which there is no adequate remedy at law by disqualifying petitioner’s undersigned counsel. We grant the petition and quash the order of the trial court disqualifying petitioner’s attorney.
Petitioner requested Mr. Salmon to represent him in his dissolution of marriage. Mr. Salmon, who had represented Mr. Eplee in a criminal ease 16 years earlier, agreed to do so, but filed a motion to determine the existence of any conflict that would prevent him from representing petitioner. A hearing was held on the motion upon which the trial court determined that while representing petitioner 16 years ago, Mr. Salmon advised petitioner’s girlfriend (respondent) that she could claim spousal immunity and refuse to testify if she married petitioner. The trial court found that this advice established an attorney-client relationship between Mr. Salmon and respondent, and the court entered an order disqualifying Mr. Salmon from representing petitioner in the pending dissolution of marriage.
Orders granting or denying motions to disqualify a party’s attorney may be appropriately reviewed by certiorari. See Kenn Air Corp. v. Gainesville-Alachua County Reg'l Airport Auth., 593 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979), the Fifth District Court of Appeal emphasized the gravity of disqualifying an attorney, and set forth the standard to be applied:
Requiring the disqualification of an attorney is ... a matter of no small consequence. Thus, before a client’s former attorney will be disqualified from representing a party whose interests are adverse to the former client’s, the former client must show that the matters embraced in the pending suit are substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former client.
(Citations omitted). Applying that standard in Jenkins v. Harris Ins., Inc., 572 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), this court granted a petition for certiorari upon finding that the disqualification of the party’s counsel was not warranted where there was no evidence of a substantial relationship between the matters in the case at bar and those in the prior litigation, nor did counsel have access to any information during the former representation that would disadvantage the opponents in the current action.
In the instant case, Mr. Salmon’s prior relationship with respondent only concerned her testimony as a witness against petitioner and her protection from liability to criminal prosecution. Although the advice of Mr. Salmon may have encouraged respondent to marry petitioner, respondent neither asserts that confidential matters were revealed, nor does respondent demonstrate how that advice is substantially related to the current dissolution proceeding.
We, therefore, grant the petition and quash the order requiring petitioner’s attorney to disqualify himself.
WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Carnival Corp. v. Beverly, 744 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…vide ample precedent for review of such orders by petitions for writs of certiorari. See Pinebrook Towne House Ass’n, Inc. v. C.E. O’Dell and Assocs., Inc., 725 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (quashing order of disqualification); Eplee v. Eplee, 722 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (same). See also Transmark, USA, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Ins., 631 So. 2d 1112, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reaching merits of order denying disqualification of counsel and denying cer-tiorari); Kenn Air Corp. v. Gainesville-A…
Authorities Cited
- Sears v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)
- Kenn AIR Corp. v. Gainesville-Alachua Cnty. Reg'l Airport Auth., 593 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Jenkins v. Harris Ins., Inc., 572 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)