JOHN SANTIAGO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a positive drug test did not violate probation because random drug testing was not a condition of probation, but missed therapy sessions did constitute a violation.
John Santiago appealed the revocation of his probation, which was based on testing positive for marijuana and cocaine and missing four group therapy s…
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PER CURIAM.
John Santiago appeals an order revoking his probation after the trial court found that he violated special condition nine of his probation order because he tested positive for marijuana and cocaine and missed four group therapy sessions. We reverse and remand.
The ninth condition of Santiago’s probation order required him to “undergo a psychological evaluation and successfully complete any treatment program required.” During the fourth year of his probation, his therapist ordered him to undergo random drug testing. We find error in the trial court’s finding that Santiago’s positive test for controlled substances violated condition nine because his probation order did not command random drug testing and his treatment for a sex offense did not logically contemplate such tests. See Voudry v. State, 641 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)(hold-ing probation may only be revoked for violating court-imposed conditions).
We find, however, that the record supports the trial court’s determination that Santiago’s absence from his group therapy sessions constituted a willful violation of probation. Santiago offered no excuse for missing the group sessions, and we reject his argument that his attendance at individual therapy sessions denotes a reasonable effort to comply with all of the terms of probation. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to determine whether it would have revoked Santiago’s probation based solely on his unexcused absences from his group therapy sessions. See Thompson v. State, 710 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Reversed and remanded with directions.
STONE, C.J., and POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Lawson v. State, 941 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…State, 814 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“Generally, un-ex-cused absences from required therapeutic programs constitute willful violations of probation.”) (citing Boyd v. State, 756 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Santiago v. State, 722 So. 2d 950, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). We begin our analysis by noting that pursuant to the plea agreement, Lawson specifically agreed to submit to the requirements of drug offender probation. The contours of drug offender probation are defined by section 948.…
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Marcano v. State, 814 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…e, 795 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Generally, un-excused absences from required therapeutic programs constitute willful violations of probation. See, e.g., Boyd v. State, 756 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Santiago [*1177] v. State, 722 So. 2d 950, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). However, “mental illness can fender violations of probation not willful and substantial.” Robinson v. State, 744 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (unspecified mental illness); see also Williams v. State, 728 So. 2d 287,…
Authorities Cited
- C.A. Burnette v. Grove Isle Club, Inc., 710 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Amaya v. State, 641 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Voudry v. State, 641 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)