BERNARD FIELDS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Bernard Fields appealed the denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found during a street encounter with a police officer. The appellate court affirmed his conviction, holding that the officer's questioning was a brief, innocuous encounter that did not constitute an unlawful investigatory stop and did not violate Fields' Fourth Amendment rights.
The court held no abuse of discretion occurred and affirmed the conviction and sentence. The encounter was a brief, innocuous questioning that did not constitute an investigatory stop, and a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, thus the seizure of cocaine was lawful.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to suppress contraband when the encounter between law enforcement and the defendant was innocuous and did…
[2] An investigatory stop occurs when police officers inform individuals that they suspect criminal activity and intend to investigate further, leading a reasonable person to…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the police questioning was innocuous in nature. A single police officer simply queried what appellant was doing standing in the street at 4:00 a.m. and asked for his identification.”
Establishes the court's characterization of the officer's conduct as non-coercive and distinguishable from an investigatory stop
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Milkman encountered Fields and a companion standing in the street at 4:00 a.m. The officer asked them what they were doing and requested ident…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Reasonable Person Standard cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the contraband. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion, we affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence.
Officer Milkman encountered appellant around 4:00 a.m. when she approached appellant and his companion, who were standing in the street, and asked them what they were doing and requested to see their identifications. When the men answered that they were “hanging out” and were unable to produce identification, Officer Milkman reached for her notepad to write down their names and addresses so that she could run a radio check. As the officer reached for her pad, appellant proceeded to drop a plastic baggie containing crack cocaine to the ground.
In support of his argument that the crack cocaine should have been suppressed, appellant analogizes the case at bar to Barna v. State, 636 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). However, we find that ease distinguishable. In Barna, this court concluded that an investigatory stop had occurred when two police officers approached Barna and his friend and stated that they suspected criminal activity and “were going to investigate a little further.” Id. at 572. The officers then proceeded to: ask both men for their identifications, which the officer received; run a teletype check; and ask Barna why he was nervous and whether he had any drugs. In response, Barna lifted his hands above his head and said that he did not have any drugs but to “go ahead and search if you want.” Thereafter, the police confiscated drugs and paraphernalia, which this court concluded had to be suppressed because, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. See id.
By contrast, in the instant case, the police questioning was innocuous in nature. A single police officer simply queried what appellant was doing standing in the street at 4:00 a.m. and asked for his identification. While in Bama the police officers informed Barna that they were suspicious, that they were going to do some investigating, and asked whether Barna had drugs, the encounter at issue in this case was much less extensive, and did not involve circumstances that would prevent a reasonable person from feeling free to leave.
Affirmed.
WARNER, FARMER, JJ., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Alphonso Clemons v. State, 747 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…the “drop then stop” line of cases. Neither officer testified that they ordered Clemons to stop. At most, the officer asked Clemons for identification. Asking for identification does not constitute a Fourth Amendment detention. See Fields v. State, 722 So. 2d 957, 958 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); State v. Barnett, 572 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Thus, the officer’s request for identification did not amount to a seizure of Clemons. Clemons argues, however, that there was a sufficient show of authority by t…
Authorities Cited
- Barna v. State, 636 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)