VILLARD GEORGES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Villard Georges was convicted of aggravated assault but acquitted of aggravated battery stemming from driving a car at a victim. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's Batson challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a black juror, and also identifying evidentiary errors regarding victim bolstering and improper cross-examination limitations.
The trial court erred in determining that the state's peremptory challenge was exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner, as the stated reason was not supported by the record and was pretextual. The trial court also erred in allowing the prosecutor to bolster the victim's testimony with prior consistent statements on redirect examination and in improperly limiting the defendant's cross-examination regarding the victim's potential bias, though the court correctly rejected the defendant's attempt to introduce criminal liability information without a proper foundation.
[1] A prosecutor's stated reason for exercising a peremptory challenge must be supported by the record.
[2] A trial court's recollection of a juror's voir dire testimony must be accurate to support a ruling on a Batson challenge.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find that the trial court erred in its determination that the state's exercise of a peremptory challenge against a black juror was exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner.”
Establishes the primary basis for reversal—the trial court's error in overruling the Batson challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory strike of a black juror.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVillard Georges drove a car at victim Matthew Scanlon and allegedly struck him in the leg. A jury found Georges not guilty of aggravated battery but g…
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GROSS, J.
We grant appellant’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute the following.
Appellant Villard Georges was charged with one count of aggravated battery and one count of aggravated assault. The charges arose out of an incident where Georges drove a car at victim Matthew Scanlon, and allegedly hit him in the leg. The evidence concerning the assault was strong; the evidence as to the battery was equivocal. A jury found the defendant not guilty of the aggravated battery and' guilty of the aggravated assault. Georges appeals from his judgment and sentence.
We find that the trial court erred in its determination that the state’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against a black juror was exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764-65 (Fla.1996). The prosecutor’s reason for excusing the juror was that the juror had indicated that he had been fired from a job, without knowing the reason for the termination. The state analogized this situation to that of Georges, who was fired as a result of the incident in this ease. The trial court denied the challenge. However, the trial court’s recollection of what the juror said during voir dire was incorrect. See Nunez v. State, 664 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
Nothing in the record supports the prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing the juror. The jurors were never asked if they had ever been fired from a job. They were asked a related question about whether anyone had ever had to fire someone or might not be able to fire someone. Contrary to the state’s contention in its brief, we find nothing in the record to indicate that the black juror non-verbally responded to relevant questions. Where non-verbal responses might be inferred, each was followed by questioning of the juror making the response. This was not a case where the judge acknowledged or described the non-record behavior which could form the basis for a racially neutral reason for a challenge. See Hill v. State, 547 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
We address other issues which might arise on retrial.
We agree with Georges that the trial court erred in allowing the state to bolster the testimony of the victim with prior consistent statements. For example, on cross-examination the victim stated that his left shin had been injured; defense counsel then questioned the victim about his statement to the police, which indicated that the car had struck his right leg, and caused an abrasion to his calf; on redirect examination, the prosecutor introduced a prior statement of the victim that the car “clipped” a leg, without reference to right or left. A second incident of bolstering related to the victim’s version of statements made by the defendant during a fight. The impeachment of the victim on this issue was weak, depending on the absence of certain language from a police statement, in which the victim had not responded to direct questions about statements made by the defendant.
Finally, Georges argues that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the victim. Defense counsel questioned the victim about what he did after being clipped by the defendant’s car. The victim said that he got up, went over to the vehicle, opened the driver’s side door, and grabbed the defendant “because he was reaching in the center console to get something.” The court then sustained the state’s objections to the following questions: “Is it a crime to strike someone while they’re in a car?” and “[D]o you know ... burglary with a battery is punishable by life; it’s a first degree felony?” The trial court rejected the defense argument that the questions were proper to establish the “motive” or “bias” of the victim. This ruling was correct, since the defense did not demonstrate a preliminary basis for the questions, even assuming that their form was proper. See § 90.105(1), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Neither through the testimony of the police, nor the examination of the victim did Georges establish that anyone, anywhere, had contemplated a burglary charge against the victim.
Thus, there was no anchor in the evidence for the argument that the victim had lied to avoid the serious criminal charges of burglary.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.
STONE, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur.
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Carlton A. Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2001)…rt correctly determined that the explanation provided was not pretextual (i.e., step 3). More specifically, the issue is whether such a determination may be made when there is no on-the-record basis for the challenge. Recently, in Georges v. State, 723 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the district court addressed a situation where the State peremptorily challenged an African American juror on the basis that she nodded in affirmation to the question of whether anyone had been fired from a job without knowing t…
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Young v. State, 744 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…edibility was severely compromised by an inaccurate recollection of the questioning during voir dire. See Brown v. State, 733 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Michelin N. America, Inc. v. Lovett, 731 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Georges v. State, 723 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Applying Melbourne to this case, we affirm, since we do not find that the trial court’s rulings were clearly erroneous. Mr. Bayonne The state struck Mr. Bayonne. The defense asked for a reason why Bayonne, an African-American…
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Whitby v. State, 933 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…2000); English v. State, 740 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Foster v. State, 732 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Michelin N. Am., Inc. v. Lovett, 731 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Henry v. State, 724 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Georges v. State, 723 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Kiwanis Club of Little Havana v. de Kalafe, 723 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Greene v. State, 718 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Randall v. State, 718 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Overstreet v. State, 712 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jeanie H. Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996)
- Hill v. State, 547 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Nunez v. State, 664 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)