N.H., A CHILD, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A juvenile petitioner sought habeas corpus relief claiming double jeopardy violations after a trial court imposed additional detention time from a previously suspended contempt sentence. The appellate court agreed the trial court violated double jeopardy protections by increasing punishment based on the same conduct, but dismissed the petition as moot since the petitioner had already been released from secure detention.
The trial court violated the double jeopardy clause by imposing additional punishment based on the same conduct. Once a court has sentenced a person to serve a portion of a suspended sentence, it cannot increase that person's penalty based on the same conduct, as this constitutes multiple punishments for the same offense.
[1] The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits increasing a defendant's penalty based on the same conduct for which a sentence has already been imposed.
[2] Once a defendant begins to serve a lawful sentence, the court cannot resentence the defendant for an increased term of incarceration for the same offense.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“once the court sentenced her to serve 25 days of the original suspended sentence, the court could not increase petitioner's penalty based on the same conduct. This is a clear violation of the double jeopardy clause, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.”
Establishes the core holding that increasing punishment after sentencing for the same conduct violates double jeopardy
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court originally sentenced petitioner to 75 days secure detention for contempt of court in five cases, suspending the sentence. When petitio…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner seeks discharge from custody pursuant to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the trial court violated her double jeopardy rights.
The trial court originally placed petitioner in secure detention for 75 days for contempt of court in five cases, suspending the sentence. When petitioner violated community control, the trial court required her to serve 25 days of the suspended sentence. After petitioner had served the 25 days, and without any intervening misconduct, the trial court ordered petitioner to serve the remaining 50 days of her original suspended sentence, to ensure that she would be detained until she could be placed in a moderate risk facility. Although petitioner has now been placed, she argues that the double jeopardy issue raised by the trial court’s action is capable of repetition, yet evading review, and therefore should be addressed. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla.1984).
We agree.
The trial court in this case could have required petitioner to serve the entire suspended sentence based on her violation of community control.
However, once the court sentenced her to serve 25 days of the original suspended sentence, the court could not increase petitioner’s penalty based on the same conduct. This is a clear violation of the double jeopardy clause, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. See, e.g., Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1994) (double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense prohibits extending a term of probation absent additional violations); Ruffin v. State, 589 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (once a person begins to serve a lawful sentence, he may not thereafter be resentenced for an increased term of incarceration); Johnson v. State, 574 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)(once a defendant has commenced serving a valid sentence, the court cannot constitutionally again sentence the defendant for the same offense or make the original sentence more onerous).
Accordingly, we disapprove the trial court’s imposition of additional punishment, which was clearly an attempt to avoid the statutory limitation on the term of secure detention which may be imposed. See A.W. v. State, 711 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (term a child may be held in secure detention pending placement is restricted by section 985.215(10)(a)l, Florida Statutes).
We decline to address the issue regarding the stacking of terms of' secure detention raised by petitioner, as the basis for the original suspended sentence is unclear. We agree with the petitioner as to the double jeopardy issue, but the application for discharge is moot since petitioner is no longer being held in secure detention. Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed as moot.
COBB, W. SHARP and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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Columbus Rickey Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003)…d and the person begins to serve the sentence, that sentence may not be increased without running afoul of double jeopardy principles. See, e.g., Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1994); Clark v. State, 579 So. 2d 109 (Fla.1991); N.H. v. State, 723 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). To do so is a clear violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits multiple punishment for the same offense. See State v. Wilson, 680 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla.1996). Here, the trial court brought Ashley back to court and r…
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Mehl v. State, 16 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…d and the person begins to serve the sentence, that sentence may not be increased without running afoul of double jeopardy principles. See, e.g., Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1994); Clark v. State, 579 So. 2d 109 (Fla.1991); N.H. v. State, 723 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). To do so is a clear violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits multiple punishment for the same offense. See State v. Wilson, 680 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla.1996). Ashley, 850 So. 2d at 1267. Accordingly, we remand thi…
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Foster Lee Brown v. State, 132 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…sentence may not be increased without running afoul of double jeopardy principles.” Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla.2003) (citing Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1994); Clark v. State, 579 So. 2d 109 (Fla.1991); and N.H. v. State, 723 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)). The post-sentencing amendment of a judgment to impose an HFO designation is a double jeopardy violation that can be remedied pursuant to rule 3.800(a) if it is apparent from the face of the record. State v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Eugene Holly, M.D. v. Albert W. Auld, M.D., 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984)
- Lippman v. State, 633 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1994)
- Johnson v. State, 574 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Ruffin v. State, 589 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- A.W. v. State, 711 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)