IAN SIMMONS, APPELLANT,
v.
ROYAL FLORAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC., APPELLEE
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In this appellate fee review, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a trial court properly refused to apply a multiplier to attorney's fees awarded under a contract provision in a covenant-not-to-compete case, because the appellant failed to present evidence that a contingent fee arrangement was necessary to obtain competent counsel.
The court held that a multiplier should not be imposed absent evidence that a contingent fee arrangement was necessary for the prevailing party to obtain competent counsel. Since no such evidence was presented, the trial court properly refused to apply a multiplier.
[1] A contingency fee multiplier may be awarded in contract cases only if there is evidence that such an arrangement was necessary to obtain competent counsel.
[2] The necessity of a contingency fee arrangement for obtaining competent counsel is a prerequisite for imposing a multiplier on the non-prevailing party.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[t]he trial court should consider the following factors in determining whether a multiplier is necessary: (1) whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel; (2) whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way; and (3) whether any of the factors set forth in [Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985)] are applicable.”
The three-factor test from Quanstrom for determining whether a contingency fee multiplier is warranted in tort and contract cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involved a dispute regarding a covenant not to compete. Prevailing party attorney's fees were awarded pursuant to a contractual provision. Th…
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ORDER ON MOTION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER ASSESSING APPELLATE ATTORNEYS’ FEES
KLEIN, Judge.
The issue raised by this motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(c) is whether counsel for appellant, who was on a contingent fee, should have been given the benefit of a multiplier for his services rendered on a prior appeal. Prevailing party attorney’s fees were awarded pursuant to the contract which was the subject of the lawsuit, which involved a covenant not to compete. The trial court refused to apply a multiplier. In Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 834 (Fla.1990), our supreme court held that in tort and contract eases:
[t]he trial court should consider the following factors in determining whether a multiplier is necessary: (1) whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel; (2) whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way; and (3) whether any of the factors set forth in [Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985)] are applicable.
We interpret Quanstrom to mean that, in a ease like this one, there must be evidence that a contingent fee arrangement was necessary in order for the prevailing party to have obtained competent counsel if a multiplier is to be imposed on the nonprevailing party. There was no such evidence presented here. We have considered the other issues raised and find them to be without merit.1 Denied.
GLICKSTEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . We need not reach the question which we certified in U.S.B. Acquisition v. Stamm, 695 So. 2d 373, 376 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 703 So. 2d 475 (Fla.1997):
Is a contingency risk multiplier inapplicable to a court awarded attorney’s fee where the only authority for fees is predicated on a contractual provision and not a statute? We had previously certified the same question in Command Credit Corp. v. Mineo, 664 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), because of our concern with the statement the supreme court made in Sun Bank of Ocala v. Ford, 564 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla.1990) that it "never has been contemplated that a court should utilize a contingent-fee multiplier to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee” in a suit on a promissory note. The parties in Mineo apparently did not seek review of our opinion.
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Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., Inc., 734 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1999)…t case “there must be evidence that a contingent fee arrangement was necessary in order for the prevailing party to have obtained competent counsel if a multiplier is to be imposed on the nonprevailing party.” Simmons v. Royal Floral Distrib., Inc., 724 So. 2d 99, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Based on a thorough analysis of our opinions, we find no precedent from this Court precluding a trial court from considering a contingency risk multiplier in a contract case. To the contrary, there is much support to be fou…
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Gonzalez v. Angel Veloso, M.D., 731 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…challenges the lower court’s rulings that rejected her claim to a multiplier and denied expert witness fees for the attorneys who testified on her behalf at the hearing. We affirm in both respects. As in Simmons v. Royal Floral Distributors, Inc., 724 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), we conclude that when, as was the case below, the court could properly have found that “the relevant market [did not require] a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel,”2 Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555.…
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Michnal v. Palm Coast Dev., Inc., 842 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…o the legal system. As discussed in Quan-strom and its progeny, the appropriate time frame for determining whether a multiplier is “necessary” is when the party is seeking the employ of counsel. See, e.g., Simmons v. Royal Floral Distributors, Inc., 724 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(there must be evidence that a contingent fee agreement was necessary in order for the prevailing party to have obtained competent counsel if a multiplier is to be imposed on the nonprevailing party). Here, the trial court found…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)
- SUN Bank OF Ocala v. Jacques Ford, 564 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1990)
- Command Credit Corp. v. Mineo, 664 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- U.S.B. Acquisition Co., Inc. v. Stamm, 695 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)