HARRY WILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Harry Wilson appeals his convictions for dealing in stolen property, burglary, and petit theft, arguing the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta inquiry before permitting him to represent himself. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court abused its discretion by allowing self-representation without inquiring into Wilson's capacity to make that decision.
The trial court abused its discretion by permitting Wilson to represent himself without first conducting the inquiry required under Faretta v. California and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3). Reversal and remand for a new trial is required because the trial court failed to make the proper determination regarding Wilson's literacy, competence, understanding, and voluntary exercise of informed free will.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by permitting a defendant to represent himself without first conducting an adequate inquiry into the defendant's capacity to make the…
[2] Once a defendant makes an unequivocal demand for self-representation, the obligation to conduct a Faretta inquiry is triggered.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once a defendant makes an unequivocal demand for self-representation, the obligation to conduct a Faretta inquiry is triggered.”
Establishes that a Faretta inquiry is mandatory when a defendant explicitly requests to represent himself
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarry Wilson was convicted of dealing in stolen property, burglary of a structure, and petit theft. Wilson asserted his right to self-representation, …
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DAVIS, J.
Harry Wilson appeals his convictions for dealing in stolen property, burglary of a structure, and petit theft. Wilson asserts that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into his capacity to make the decision to represent himself.1 We find that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Wilson to represent himself without first making the inquiry required under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3).2 Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Once a defendant makes an unequivocal demand for self-representation, the obligation to conduct a Faretta inquiry is triggered. Cf. Smith v. State, 641 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla.1994), cert. denied mem., 513 U.S. 1163, 115 S.Ct. 1129, 130 L.Ed.2d 1091 (1995)(no Faretta inquiry required in the absence of an explicit assertion of the right to self-representation).
The test is not whether the defendant is competent to represent himself adequately, but whether he is competent to make the decision to represent himself. See State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla.1997), cert. denied mem., — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 865, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998).
We rec ognize that the trial “court’s ruling turns primarily on an assessment of demeanor and credibility,” and thus, “its decision is entitled to great weight and will be affirmed on review if supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.” Potts v. State, 718 So. 2d 757, 23 Fla.
L. Weekly S450 (Fla.1998). Further, the “reviewing court should focus not on the specific advice rendered by the trial court — for there are no ‘magic words’ under Faretta — but rather on the defendant’s general understanding of his or her rights.” Id. at S450-S451, 718 So. 2d at 760.
The inquiry in the present case was deficient. “[T]he trial judge must make a determination that the defendant is literate, competent and understanding, and that he is voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” Smith v. State, 546 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied mem., 554 So. 2d 1168 (Fla.1989). In the present case, the trial court advised Wilson against proceeding on his own, and told him that he would have to follow the rules of evidence and procedure, but failed to make any inquiry into the factors which have come to be recognized as relevant to the determination “that the defendant is literate, competent and understanding, and that he is voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” Id.
The record discloses no inquiry into Wilson’s age, ability to read, ability to write, education, whether he was currently under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or had ever been diagnosed or treated for any mental illness, whether he had any physical problems which would hinder self-representation, or whether he had ever represented himself in a trial before.
The harmless error rule does not apply to this issue. See State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla.1993). Reversal is required because the trial court failed to conduct a proper Faretta inquiry. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial.
JOANOS and KAHN, JJ., concur. .Wilson also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for burglary. Because we reverse and remand for a new trial on the first ground, we need not address this argument.
.We note that the trial court did not have the benefit of the newly adopted model Faretta inquiry approved by the Florida Supreme Court. See Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.J 1 l(d)(2)-(3), 719 So. 2d 873, 23 Fla. L. Weekly S391 (Fla. 199 8).
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Cravelyn Hooker v. State, 152 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…a, ‘[t]he test is not whether the defendant is competent to represent himself adequately, but whether he is competent to make the decision to • represent himself.’ ” Smith v. State, 956 So. 2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Wilson v. State, 724 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)). As Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) provides: Regardless of the defendant’s legal skills or the complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself or hers…
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Frazier Lewis v. State, 766 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…. State, 605 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(“The request to proceed pro se must be clear and unequivocal.”), review denied, 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1993). Since the trial court did not, Lewis’ convictions must be reversed. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 724 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding that failure to conduct a Faretta inquiry is not subject to a harmless error analysis and citing State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla.1993)); Haslom v. State, 643 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). REVERSED and…
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Smith v. State, 956 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…hearing conducted by the trial court, and reverse on this ground. Prior to trial, Smith made an unequivocal demand to represent himself, thus triggering an obligation on the part of the trial court to conduct a Faretta inquiry. See Wilson v. State, 724 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Before a defendant will be permitted to represent himself, “he must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo his constitutional right to counsel.” Reddick v. State, 937 So. 2d 1279, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Under Faretta, “[t]h…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1997)
- State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1993)
- Potts v. State, 718 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1998)
- Amendment TO Fla. Rule OF Crim. Procedure 3.111(d)(2)-(3), 719 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1998)
- Smith v. State, 641 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1994)
- Smith v. State, 546 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Smith v. Dahm, 513 U.S. 1163 (U.S. 1995)
- Lin v. California, 513 U.S. 1163 (U.S. 1995)