THERESA SIENIARECKI, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1998-12-30
No. 98-0997
STONE, C.J., GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur.
724 So. 2d 626 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

The court held that the statutes criminalizing neglect of a disabled person are not facially unconstitutional for lacking a specific intent requirement or for vagueness, and that a right to privacy cannot be asserted vicariously.


Headnotes

[1] Statutes are presumptively constitutional and may dispense with the element of intent, punishing particular acts without regard to the offender's mental attitude.

[2] A statute penalizing the failure to act without specific intent withstands a due process challenge if the failure to act would alert a reasonable person to the consequenc…

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was convicted of neglect of a disabled person arising from her mother's death. She appealed, arguing the statutes were unconstitutional and …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to section 825.102(3), Florida Statutes (1997), appellant was convicted of neglect of a disabled person arising from the death of her mother. She appeals her conviction on several grounds, none of which we find meritorious. We affirm.

Appellant first contends that sections 782.07(2) and 825.102(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), are facially unconstitutional because they do not contain a specific intent requirement and thereby violate due process by imposing an affirmative duty upon appellant to act, while penalizing her failure to comply.1 It is well established that statutes are presumptively constitutional. See Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla.1994). In addition, the Legislature has the “power to dispense with the element of intent and thereby punish particular acts without regard to the mental attitude of the offender.” State v. Oxx, 417 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In State v. Gruen, 586 So. 2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), the third district held that a statute which penalizes the failure to act without containing an element of specific intent will withstand a due process attack if neglecting to take action under the circumstances would alert a reasonable person to recognize the consequence of his or her deeds. Similarly, in the present case, the sections at issue regarding the neglect of the elderly or disabled do not punish mere presence, or wholly passive conduct, but rather penalize the failure of a person to provide basic food, shelter, clothing and medical needs, only where he or she has assumed such a duty. For the above reasons, we hold that the statutes are not facially unconstitutional as violating due process.

Appellant next argues that the above sections are unconstitutionally vague. We have held that the challenge of a statute for vagueness will not prevail where the record establishes that the appellant engaged in conduct clearly proscribed by the meaning of the statute. See Wilburn v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1544, D1544 (Fla. 4th DCA June 24), rev. denied, 719 So. 2d 894 (Fla.1998). We think the evidence at trial clearly showed that appellant’s conduct fell squarely within the conduct proscribed by the statutes at issue. Thus, appellant’s vagueness claim must fail.

Appellant’s final claim on appeal is that section 782.07(2) violates her mother’s right to privacy embodied in Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. Specifi cally, she asserts that her mother had the right to refuse medical treatment, and as a result appellant cannot be convicted of neglect for failure to provide proper medical attention. However, “constitutional rights are personal in nature and generally may not be asserted vicariously.” State v. Long, 544 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250, 111 S.Ct. 2888, 115 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991). Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.

AFFIRMED.

STONE, C.J., GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur. . Section 782.07(2), Florida Statutes (1997), provides:

A person who causes the death of any elderly person or disabled adult by culpable negligence under s. 825.102(3) commits aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Section 825.102(3), Florida Statutes (1997), provides:

(3)(a) "Neglect of an elderly person or disabled adult” means:
1. A caregiver's failure or omission to provide an elderly person or disabled adult with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the elderly person's or disabled adult's physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the elderly person or disabled adult; or

2. A caregiver’s failure to make a reasonable effort to protect an elderly person or disabled adult from abuse, neglect, or exploitation by another person.

Neglect of an elderly person or disabled adult may be based on repeated conduct or on a single incident or omission that results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, serious physical or psychological injury, or a substantial risk of death, to an elderly person or disabled adult.

(b) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects an elderly person or disabled adult and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the elderly person or disabled adult commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(c) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects an elderly person or disabled adult without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the elderly person or disabled adult commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2000)
    …t limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the ... disabled adult.” The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Sieniarecki v. State, 724 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), expressly declared the applicable provisions of chapter 825, Florida Statutes, to be valid. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we uphold the statutory provisions involved, and app…
  • Jean v. State, 764 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
    …(where statute provides adequate notice that appellant’s conduct is unlawful, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face because it is not vague in all of its applications), rev. denied, 719 So. 2d 894 (Fla.1998); Sieniarecki v. State, 724 So. 2d 626, 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“the challenge of a statute for vagueness will not prevail where the record establishes that the appellant engaged in conduct clearly proscribed by the meaning of the statute”). The state presented Officer Hermanson’s testi…
  • Peterson v. State, 765 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …iver.” He asserts that the statutory scheme does not punish mere presence or wholly passive conduct. In Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68 (Fla.2000), the supreme court approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision in Sieniarecki v. State, 724 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), which sustained the defendant’s conviction under section 825.102(3) and upheld the constitutionality of that section. In particular, the defendant in Sieniarecki had asserted that section 825.102(3) was unconstitutionally vague…

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