PAMELA D. MOBLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWIN R. MOBLEY, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred by failing to list and equitably distribute two marital assets in the final judgment of dissolution.
During a contentious divorce, the parties focused on a custody battle, leading to a sparse presentation of marital assets. Two assets, a deferred comp…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PETERSON, J.
Pamela D. Mobley appeals the final judgment dissolving her marriage. Although she raises several points on appeal, we find merit only in her allegation that all of the marital assets were not listed in the final judgment and that they were not equitably distributed.
We remind the parties that it is their obligation to present evidence of the existence and value of marital assets and the existence and balances due of marital debts in order for the court to include them in the final judgment. See Moon v. Moon, 594 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
In this ease, the parties were embroiled in a custody battle that dominated the trial and presentation of the details of marital assets was slim, except for the marital residence which was adequately described and awarded in the final judgment. The record does reflect, however, that two marital assets existed at the time the petition for dissolution was filed and that the former husband liquidated them shortly thereafter, without giving any detail as to the disposition of the proceeds, except that the former wife did not receive any portion of them. The assets, a deferred compensation plan valued at $7,744 and Texaco stock valued at $1,074, should have been listed as marital assets and awarded in some equitable manner to the parties or an expla nation made of their omission. § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. (1997).
We affirm the final judgment with the exception of the omission of these two marital assets and remand to the trial court to either award one half ($4,409) of the value of these two assets to the former wife or supplement the judgment with findings, reasons, and awards for some other manner of disposition.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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Gaetani-Slade v. Slade, 852 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…dissolution of marriage action have an obligation “to present evidence of the existence and value of marital assets and the existence and balances due of marital debts in order for the court to include them in the final judgment.” Mobley v. Mobley, 724 So. 2d 697, 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Toward that end, Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.285(d)(10) states, in pertinent part: (d) Parties’ Disclosure Requirements for Initial or Supplemental Proceedings. A party shall serve the following documents in an…
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Mobley v. Mobley, 920 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…to either award one half ($4,409) of the value of these two assets to the former wife or supplement the judgment with findings, reasons, and awards for some other manner of disposition. AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Mobley v. Mobley, 724 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (emphasis added). In June 2001, the former wife filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment Consistent With Appellate Opinion in which she asked the lower court to act on this Court’s directive. In October 2002, the lower court entered…
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Authorities Cited
- Moon v. Moon, 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)