CAROLINE GILBERT, APPELLANT,
v.
PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS AND CARE ADMINISTRATORS SERVICES, APPELLEES
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Caroline Gilbert, a Publix assistant manager, sought workers' compensation for injuries sustained in an automobile accident during her morning commute. The court affirmed the denial of compensability, holding that the fact she was transporting work-related materials (a newsletter) did not convert her personal commute into a compensable employment journey.
The court held that the injuries are not compensable. Although claimant prepared the newsletter as an employment duty and transported it to work, these facts are insufficient to make her home a second job site or to except her from the going and coming rule. The commute's primary purpose was personal (getting to work), and the newsletter delivery was merely incidental.
[1] An employee's commute to a regular place of employment is generally not considered a work-related activity for the purpose of workers' compensation, absent specific excep…
[2] An employee's home is not considered a second job site merely because some work-related tasks are performed there for the employee's own convenience.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although claimant had completed preparation of a newsletter for Publix at home before embarking on her journey to work, and the newsletter was present in her car at the time of the accident, these facts are not sufficient to compel compensability of her injuries.”
Establishes that transporting work materials during a commute does not automatically make injuries compensable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGilbert was injured in an automobile accident at approximately 3:45 a.m. on January 26, 1995, while driving from her home to her Publix workplace. She…
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PER CURIAM.
Caroline Gilbert, the claimant and a former assistant manager for the employer-ap-pellee, Publix Supermarkets, appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims denying compensability for the injuries she sustained in an automobile accident which occurred at approximately 3:45 a.m. on January 26, 1995, en route from her home to her place of employment at Publix. We affirm on all issues, but write briefly to address the compensability question.
Although claimant had completed preparation of a newsletter for Publix at home before embarking on her journey to work, and the newsletter was present in her car at the time of the accident, these facts are not sufficient to compel compensability of her injuries. Competent, substantial evidence in the record supports the finding, that claimant prepared the newsletter at home for her own convenience. This fact was not sufficient to constitute her home a second job site. Thus, it cannot be said that she was injured while traveling between two employment premises and was thereby excepted from the going and coming rule. See Santa Rosa Junior College v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd., 40 Cal.3d 345, 220 Cal.Rptr. 94, 708 P. 2d 673 (Cal.1985). Similarly, although preparation of the newsletter was an employment duty, it was not necessary that the newsletter be brought to work the morning of January 26,1995. The purpose of claimant’s commute early that morning was to carry out her responsibilities relating to opening the store at 4:00 a.m. Her delivery of the newsletter was merely an incidental part of the trip. She would not have made the drive if the personal motive (going to work) was removed. Swartz v. McDonald’s Corporation, - So. 2d -, 1998 WL 821772, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2521 (Fla. 1st DCA, November 12, 1998).
AFFIRMED.
BENTON, VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.
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Gilbert v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 790 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 2001)…QUINCE, J. We have for review Gilbert v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 724 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), which is alleged to expressly and directly conflict with our opinions in Nikko Gold Coast Cruises v. Gulliford, 448 So. 2d 1002 (Fla.1984), and Cook v. Highway Casualty Co., 82 So. 2d 679 (Fla.1955), and which cited to the First…
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Fla. Hosp. v. Garabedian, 765 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…essential to the business of the employer, such that the travel would have been required even had it not coincided with the employee’s personal mo [*990] tive for making the journey. See Swartz, 726 So. 2d at 786-87; Gilbert v. Publix Supermarkets, 724 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), rev. granted, 787 So. 2d 550 (Fla.1999). However, we are persuaded that this standard does not apply in a case such as this one where a traveling employee has been found not to have completed his or her work tasks for the day be…