JUANITA ANN GRESHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Juanita Gresham was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery arising from a single continuous altercation with her husband involving a shotgun and knife. The court affirmed the attempted murder conviction but reversed the aggravated battery conviction as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, finding aggravated battery to be a lesser included offense of attempted second-degree murder.
The court held that defendant cannot be convicted of both attempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery because aggravated battery is a category 2 lesser included offense of attempted second-degree murder. Dual conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause when the offenses arise from the same continuous action and the evidence supports viewing the stabbing as part of the attempted murder.
[1] A conviction for aggravated battery is a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when it arises from the same continuous action as a conviction for attempted second degre…
[2] The determination of whether a separate charge is a category 2 lesser included offense depends on both the accusatory pleading and the evidence presented at trial.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under the Blockburger test, separate convictions for different offenses arising from a single act are permissible where each separate offense contains an element that the other lacks.”
Establishes the legal standard for determining whether multiple convictions arising from a single act violate double jeopardy principles.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant called her husband, threatened to kill him, took a loaded shotgun across town, and pointed it at him saying 'you'll be dead by 8:00.' When h…
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FARMER, J.
Defendant was charged with attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery arising from an altercation with her husband. As succinctly described by defendant’s able appellate counsel, the event occurred as follows:
“[She] called her husband on the telephone, threatened to kill him, took a loaded shotgun across town, and pointed it at him, saying ‘you’ll be dead by 8:00.’ Her husband grabbed the gun barrel, the two struggled, falling to the floor, whereupon [she] grabbed a knife and began stabbing her husband.”
As to the first count the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder, and as to the second count guilty of aggravated battery as charged. We affirm the conviction on the lesser included offense in the murder charge but reverse the conviction on the aggravated battery charge.1
The information charged in count I that defendant attempted to kill her husband by using a shotgun “or other deadly weapon” and in furtherance thereof pointed the gun at him. Court II charged that she struck him “with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife.” During the trial the prosecutor repeatedly contended that the stabbing proved an intent to commit first degree murder. Both the murder charge and the aggravated battery charge arose from the same continuous action. That is to say, although she first pointed the gun at him and stabbed him only after the gun was wrested away from her, both acts occurred in a uninterrupted sequence. Thus we view them as being but a single act.
Second degree murder is defined by statute as follows:
“The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, is murder in the second degree.... ”
§ 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). Aggravated battery is defined by statute as follows:
“A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery ... [intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or ... [u]ses a deadly weapon.”
§ 784.045(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). Under the Blockburger test,2 separate convictions for different offenses arising from a single act are permissible where each separate offense contains an element that the other lacks.3 The state argues that each of the above statutory offenses contains an element that the other lacks. We do not agree.
According to the Standard Jury Instructions, aggravated battery is a category 2 lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 372. The accusatory pleading and the evidence at trial determine whether a separate charge is properly deemed a category 2 lesser included offense. Id. at 367. In this case, both the pleading and the evidence' relied on by the state at trial are consistent with the stabbing being committed as part of the attempted second degree murder. It is therefore a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause to convict defendant of both offenses.
REVERSED AS TO CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED BATTERY.
STONE, C.J., and STEVENSON, J., concur. . We reject defendant’s contentions as to all other issues.
. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
.See § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997) ("offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.”).
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State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2005)
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Harris v. State, 111 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…. See Olivard v. State, 831 So. 2d 823, 823-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (finding that defendant’s acts occurred in one continuous event where defendant struck victim with a bicycle pump, wrestled him to the ground, and bit his ear off); Gresham v. State, 725 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (viewing defendant’s acts as “a single act” where, during an uninterrupted sequence, defendant pointed a shot gun at her husband, they struggled, he took the gun away, and she grabbed a knife and stabbed him); cf. Saavedra v…
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Russo v. State, 804 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…t observed that “his continuous resistence to the ongoing attempt to effect his arrest constitutes a single instance of obstruction” under the statute. Id. at 1181. The court held two convictions were barred by double jeopardy. In Gresham v. State, 725 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) a woman was threatening to kill her husband with a shotgun. He grabbed the gun barrel, they struggled, fell to the floor, and she then grabbed a knife and stabbed her husband. We held that the pointing of the gun and the sta…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932)