MINOUCHE NOEL, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, JEAN NOEL, AND FLORA NOEL, AND JEAN NOEL AND FLORA NOEL, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS,
v.
BROWARD GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER, D/B/A BROWARD GENERAL MEDICAL, ET AL., APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the trial court's taxation of expert discovery costs against the appellants in a medical malpractice case, holding that such costs were reasonably necessary even though the case was ultimately decided on sovereign immunity grounds.
Trial courts have broad discretion to tax expert discovery costs as reasonably necessary expenses even when the underlying claim is resolved on an immunity defense rather than the merits.
[1] Trial courts possess broad discretion to tax expert discovery costs as reasonably necessary expenses, and appellants' failure to identify specific objectionable costs pre…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants brought a medical malpractice claim against defendant doctors. The doctors obtained final summary judgment based on sovereign immunity. The…
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WARNER, J.
This is an appeal from a cost judgment entered in favor of the defendant doctors after they were granted final summary judgment in appellant’s medical malpractice claim. Appellants previously appealed the order granting summary judgment, and the supreme court decided that the doctors were entitled to sovereign immunity. See Stoll v. Noel, 694 So. 2d 701 (Fla.1997). The appellants now claim on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in taxing the physicians’ costs for expert discovery as to the malpractice issue because the discovery was not necessary, nor was it used to obtain the summary judgment based on sovereign immunity. We disagree and affirm.
The record does not show that appellants lodged objections to specific costs. Instead, the appellants made only a general objection below to the taxation of costs which were not related to the issue of sovereign immunity and failed to identify the specific costs to which they objected. In addition, the trial court was within its broad discretion to tax those items used neither at trial nor to support a motion for summary judgment if the court concluded that the taking of such depositions was “reasonably necessary.” See Willey v. M.K. Roark, Inc., 616 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The appellants’ failure to identify those specific costs which they claim were not reasonable or necessary makes it impossible for us to conclude that the trial court’s ruling was outside the broad parameters of its discretion. See Deleuw, Cather & Co. v. Grogis, 655 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
Affirmed.
STONE, C.J., and GROSS, J., concur.
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The Landmark Winter Park, LLC v. Colman, 24 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…rty was incarcerated and representing himself; thus, the cost of such items was not a normal incident of the litigant’s business overhead and more likely were incurred specifically for the purposes of the litigation); Noel v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 725 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (finding that the trial court was within its broad discretion to tax those items used neither at trial nor to support a motion for summary judgment if the court concluded that the taking of such depositions was “reasonably necess…
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Authorities Cited
- Amos W. Stoll, M.D. v. Minouche Noel, 694 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1997)
- Willey v. M.K. Roark, Inc., 616 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Deleuw v. Grogis, 655 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)