PAUL WASHINGTON LEWIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Paul Lewis petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis after completing his sentence for cocaine possession and delivery, based on a key witness's recantation of her trial testimony. The trial court denied the petition, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court failed to properly evaluate the recanting witness's credibility and did not assess whether the recanted testimony would likely produce a different verdict.
The trial court must conduct a proper two-step analysis when evaluating recanted testimony as newly discovered evidence: first, determine whether the recanting witness is testifying truthfully in the recantation, and second, assess whether the new testimony would likely result in a different verdict at a new trial. The trial court's bare assertion that it did not believe the witness, without permitting examination of the witness's demeanor or providing reasons for the credibility determination, was insufficient and reversible.
[1] A petition for a writ of error coram nobis based on recanted testimony requires the trial court to determine if the recanting witness is testifying truthfully and if the…
[2] A trial court's determination of a recanting witness's credibility must be supported by evidence in the record.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The witness's sworn statement recanting her trial testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence and the trial court must assess whether it is of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal at trial.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating recanted testimony as newly discovered evidence in coram nobis proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePaul Lewis was convicted of possession and delivery of cocaine based partly on testimony from a key witness who stated she purchased cocaine from him.…
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FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
Paul Lewis petitioned the circuit court for a writ of error coram nobis after he complet ed his sentence for possession and delivery of cocaine.1 The trial court denied the petition after receiving the sworn statement of the key witness at trial recanting her testimony that she purchased cocaine from Mr. Lewis. No other evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing. The trial judge stated that he was denying the petition because he heard the witness’s testimony at the jury trial, did not believe her to be a credible witness and could find no reason now to believe her. We reverse.
The witness’s sworn statement recanting her trial testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence and the trial court must assess whether it is of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal at trial. See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1991). In determining whether a new trial should be granted based on recanted testimony, the trial court must first determine if the recanting witness is testifying truthfully in the recantation. Once the trial court makes that determination, it must then consider whether the new testimony would likely result in a different verdict at a new trial. See Glendening v. State, 604 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
The trial court concluded that the witness was not credible, but there is no evidence in the record to support that determination. Although the witness was available to testify at the coram nobis hearing, the trial court did not permit Mr. Lewis’s counsel to present that witness’s testimony. Thus, there was no opportunity for the trial court to evaluate the witness’s demeanor. Furthermore, the trial court did not express its reasons for concluding that it did not believe the witness’s statements. It merely refers to her unexplicated background. Within that setting, we cannot conclude there was an evidentiary basis supporting the trial court’s credibility determination. We also note that the trial court did not state whether the changed testimony was capable of producing a different verdict at a new trial.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to consider Lewis’s petition in accordance with Glendening.
PATTERSON and CASANUEYA, JJ., Concur. . Although Mr. Lewis failed first to obtain permission from this court to seek coram nobis relief, normally an essential ingredient in that kind of proceeding, the State failed to raise this issue with the trial court. Because the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine such petitions, the State waived its objection. If Mr. Lewis had come to this court first, we would have granted leave to file the petition.
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McLIN v. State, 827 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 2002)…e Fourth District Court of Appeal in Robinson v. State, 736 So. 2d 93, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the First District Court of Appeal in Murrah v. State, 773 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and the Second District Court of Appeal in Lewis v. State, 725 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), on the issue of the appellate standard of review of a trial court’s summary denial of a rule 3.850 motion when the movant alleges newly discovered evidence based upon recanted testimony of a witness. The Third District’s op…
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Murrah v. State, 773 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…ns made in the motion. Post-trial recantations by state witnesses are a species of newly discovered evidence. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688, 691 & n. 4 (Fla.1998); State v. Spaziano, 692 So. 2d 174, 176-77 (Fla.1997); Lewis v. State, 725 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“The witness’s sworn statement recanting her trial testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence and the trial court must assess whether it is of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal at trial.”); Camm…
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Jamarr Lanard Scott v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)…ch they averred that, in fact, they had not seen Mr. Scott at the scene of the crime and that they had been coerced by a detective to testify otherwise. These allegations were sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 725 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ("In determining whether a new trial should be granted based on recanted testimony, the trial court must first determine if the recanting witness is testifying truthfully in the recantation."); Murrah v. State, 773 So. 2d 62…
Authorities Cited
- Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991)
- Glendening v. State, 604 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)