D.E., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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D.E., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent of first-degree misdemeanor trespass in an occupied conveyance after being found sleeping in a stolen vehicle with two confederates. The court reversed, holding that the trespass statute's 'occupied' requirement was intended to protect owners and innocent victims, not co-defendants acting in concert.
The court reversed the adjudication and held that the vehicle was not 'occupied' as intended by the trespass statute because the statute's occupancy requirement was designed to protect owners and innocent victims, not co-defendants. Therefore, D.E. should have been charged with second-degree misdemeanor trespass rather than first-degree.
[1] A statute's plain language must be interpreted in a manner that avoids absurd or unreasonable results not contemplated by the legislature.
[2] The offense of trespass in an occupied structure or conveyance requires the presence of a human being whom the trespass statute is intended to protect, such as an owner o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A plain reading of Section 810.08(1), (2)(b), the trespass statute, indicates an obvious intent by the legislature to protect owners or innocent victims who happen to be occupying a conveyance when an offender trespasses.”
Establishes the court's interpretation of the statute's purpose and the proper understanding of 'occupied' conveyance
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceD.E. and two other individuals were discovered by officers sleeping in a vehicle that had been reported stolen the previous night. D.E. was arrested a…
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GUNTHER, J.
Appellant, D.E. appeals from the lower court’s final order adjudicating him delinquent of trespass in an occupied structure. We reverse and remand.
D.E., along with a male and female, were discovered by officers sleeping in a vehicle that had been reported stolen the previous night. D.E. was arrested and charged with trespass in an occupied structure or conveyance, a first degree misdemeanor. See § 810.08(1),(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). D.E. was tried and adjudicated delinquent of the charge. This appeal followed.
Section 810.08(1), (2)(b), Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part:
(1) Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters or remains in any structure or conveyance ... commits the offense of trespass in a structure or conveyance.
(2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, trespass in a structure or conveyance is a misdemeanor of the second degree ...
(b) If there is a human being in the structure or conveyance at the time the offender trespassed, ... or was in the structure or conveyance, the trespass in a structure or conveyance is a misdemeanor of the first degree....
D.E. contends that because the vehicle was occupied by his confederates and not by persons the trespass statute was intended to protect, i.e., owners and innocent victims, the lower court erred in adjudicating him delinquent of the first degree misdemeanor, trespass to an occupied conveyance, rather than the second degree misdemeanor of trespass to a conveyance. The state responds that because D.E. was found in the vehicle with two other “human beings” at the time the vehicle was discovered, the vehicle was “occupied” as provided in the statute, and thus, was sufficient to elevate the charge to trespass to an occupied conveyance. We disagree.
A plain reading of Section 810.08(1), (2)(b), the trespass statute, indicates an obvious intent by the legislature to protect owners or innocent victims who happen to be occupying a conveyance when an offender trespasses. We do not believe that it was the intent of the legislature to protect co-defendants from one another, or to punish them more harshly for acting in concert with one another. The literal interpretation advanced by the state and the lower court lead to an unreasonable conclusion not contemplated or intended by the legislature. Therefore, we do not agree that the vehicle was “occupied” as intended by the statute at the time D.E. trespassed. As such, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SHAHOOD and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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P.W. v. State, 730 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…s entirety, we agree with the Fourth District that even had trespass been committed in this case, the fact that a fellow trespasser was in the vehicle would not raise the offense to the level of trespass in an occupied conveyance. See D.E. v. State, 725 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).…