TIMOTHY THOMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1999-01-29
No. 97-3412
BOOTH, LAWRENCE and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR.
726 So. 2d 357 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1999) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Timothy Thomas appeals his convictions for armed robbery, challenging the trial court's admission of testimony that he gave no response to one question during a police interview after waiving his Miranda rights. The First District Court of Appeal affirms, holding that a single non-response to a question does not constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent and therefore does not trigger Doyle protections against commenting on post-arrest silence.


Holding

The court held that Thomas never invoked his right to silence and that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony. A single refusal to answer one question during an otherwise lengthy post-Miranda conversation does not constitute an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and therefore comments on such a refusal do not violate Doyle.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant's silence during a post-Miranda interview is not an invocation of the right to remain silent when the defendant has waived Miranda rights and voluntarily conv…

[2] Testimony regarding a defendant's failure to answer a single question during a post-Miranda interview, after waiving the right to remain silent, is admissible.

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Key Quotes

“Thomas never invoked his right to silence and that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony.”

States the holding that no Doyle violation occurred because the defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent

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Facts & Procedural History

Timothy Thomas was arrested and interrogated by police. After being given Miranda warnings, Thomas knowingly, freely, and voluntarily waived his right…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Timothy Thomas appeals his convictions for three counts of armed robbery with a deadly weapon and concealed identity and one count of attempted armed robbery. He argues that the trial court erred in admitting a police officer’s testimony that Thomas, during an interview after his arrest and after he had waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), had no response when told by the police officer that he had been implicated by his cousin (an employee of the establishment where the robberies took place). Thomas asserts that the testimony that he had no response to one question in the middle of the interview was an impermissible comment on his right to remain silent.

We conclude that Thomas never invoked his right to silence and that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony.

Accordingly, we affirm.

The trial court expressly found that Thomas waived his Miranda rights knowingly, freely, and voluntarily. That finding of fact comes to this court clothed with a presumption of correctness. See Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 310-11 (Fla.1997); McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla.1978).

Thomas asserts that the testimony that he failed to respond to one question after waiving his Miranda rights was inadmissible under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)(due process prohibits impeaching a defendant’s testimony by commenting on post-arrest silence after the defendant had been given Miranda warnings' which implicitly promised that there would be no penalty from such silence), and State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 317 (Fla.1990)(“courts must prohibit all evidence or argument that is fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the right of silence”).

The Florida Supreme Court already rejected the argument that Doyle preeludés this testimony in Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796 (Fla.1985), death sentence vacated, 476 U.S. 1102, 106 S.Ct. 1943, 90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986), receded from on other grounds in State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1997),1 wherein the Court adopted the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeal in Ragland v. State, 358 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied mem., 365 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1978), and specifically quoted the portion of the Ragland opinion which distinguished Doyle. 474 So. 2d at 801. As in the present case, the defendant in Valle waived his Miranda rights after his arrest and participated in an interview with police. The interrogating officer in Valle, as in the present case, testified that the defendant refused to answer one question of many. In Valle, the Supreme Court quoted with approval and applied the following reasoning from Rag-land:

While we are fully aware of the restrictions placed upon prosecutors on commenting upon a defendant’s exercise of his or her constitutional right to remain silent, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 [96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91] (1976); Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975), the record before us conclusively demonstrates that appellant never invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Rather, the record reveals that after being given his Miranda warnings, appellant freely and voluntarily conversed with the police. During this post-Miranda lengthy conversation, appellant refused to answer one question of many, We do not believe that comment upon the failure to answer a single question was violative of appellant’s constitutional right, when said constitutional right was not invoked. Id. at 100.

474 So. 2d at 801.

Doyle did not involve a factual scenario in which the defendant had waived his right to silence; nor did Smith. See State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 317 n. 6 (“Smith made the quoted statement when he was in custody at the scene of the killing, but before he had been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)”).

Accordingly, finding no reversible error, we affirm.

BOOTH, LAWRENCE and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR. . In State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla.1997), the Supreme Court receded from Valle to the extent that it was inconsistent with the Owen holding that an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent does not require police to terminate the questioning. The Court held in Owen that such a request must be unequivocal.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Beckham v. State, 884 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
    …s shirt, Appellant declined to explain how that could have happened. We find no error in the court’s allowing the detective’s testimony where Appellant had been read his Miranda1 rights and had initialed a waiver of rights form. See Thomas v. State, 726 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (finding testimony that defendant had no response to question during police interview was not impermissible comment on his constitutional right to remain silent, where defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights). However…
  • Baker v. State, 760 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …motive for the killing, but failed to do so, implicating his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.3 We do not think Detective Doyle’s comment should be, construed as one pointing out a defendant’s failure to present evidence. See Thomas v. State, 726 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796 (Fla.1985), receded from on other grounds, State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1997). Fifth, Baker argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion for mistrial, because a state witness (Kennet…
  • Parker v. State, 124 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
    …y went or what they did." . An isolated comment on a defendant’s failure to answer a single question during a voluntary, post-Miranda conversation with law enforcement does not violate the constitutional right to remain silent. See Thomas v. State, 726 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). These are not the facts of our case. Mr. Parker clearly refused to answer a series of questions directly related to his activities during the time of the robbery, and comments on Mr. Parker's silence were not isolated.…

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