STEVEN L. SHELTON, PETITIONER,
v.
HARRY SINGLETARY, SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT
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The court held that a prior conviction, even if initially based on a statute later found unconstitutional, can be used for habitual violent felony offender status if the statute was reenacted and valid at the time of the current offense.
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to challenge his habitual violent felony o…
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PER CURIAM.
Steven Shelton petitions for a writ of habe-as corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. He asserts that his appellate counsel should have challenged his habitual violent felony offender sentence as being constitutionally infirm. We disagree.
Defendant-appellant committed his current offense on May 21, 1995. He was adjudicated as a habitual violent felony offender on the basis of an aggravated battery conviction of June 21, 1990. Defendant contends that since the aggravated battery conviction fell within the window period of October 1, 1989 to May 2, 1991, during which chapter 89-280 was invalid by reason of a violation of the state constitutional single subject rule, see State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla.1993), it follows that the aggravated battery conviction could not be used as a basis for habitual-izing him on his 1995 conviction. Chapter 89-280 had added the offense of aggravated battery as a basis for imposing habitualization as a habitual violent felony offender. See id.
What is relevant is the validity of the statute on the date of defendant’s current offense in 1995. The single subject violation was cured by reenactment of the habitual offender statute on May 2, 1991, and consequently the single subject violation did not exist thereafter. See id. As the habitual offender statute was entirely valid on the date of defendant’s current offense on May 21, 1995, it was permissible to use the 1990 aggravated, battery conviction as the basis for the habitual violent felony offender adjudication. See Stubbs v. State, 673 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (General Division en banc).
Petition denied.
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Richardson v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…to the HVO statute was held invalid because of a violation of the single subject rule, with the result that the effective date of the 1989 amendment was delayed to May 2, 1991. See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.1993); Shelton v. Singletary, 727 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 737 So. 2d 551 (Fla.1999).…
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Bell v. State, 747 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1993); Shelton v. Singletary, 727 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). W. SHARP, HARRIS and PETERSON, JJ., concur.…
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Cummings v. State, 257 So. 3d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…1996); Miller v. State, 460 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1984); Cummings v. State, 978 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (table decision); Goutier v. State, 692 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); State v. Gray, 633 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Shelton v. Singletary, 727 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Stubbs v. State, 673 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). SILBERMAN, VILLANTI, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
- Reinhardt Alexander Stubbs v. State, 673 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)