ORISON BILLINGS AND HERMAN CUBBEDGE, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Orison Billings and Herman Cubbedge were convicted under the third count of an indictment charging false imprisonment, confinement, and kidnapping. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed their conviction, holding that multiple distinct acts under the same general offense statute may be charged in a single count and that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
The conviction is authorized by law. When a statute makes two or more distinct acts connected with the same general offense subject to the same punishment indictable as distinct crimes, they may be coupled in one count when committed by the same person at the same time and constitute but one offense. The third count properly charged two similar, non-repugnant, non-duplicitous offenses, and ample evidence supported the verdict.
“When a statute makes either of two or more distinct acts connected with the same general offense, and subject to the same punishment, indictable as distinct crimes, they may when committed by the same person at the same time be coupled in one count and constitute but one offense.”
Establishes the legal rule governing joinder of multiple offenses in a single count of an indictment
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Whitfield, J.
The indictment herein contains three counts. In the first count it is charged that the four defendants did -without lawful authority forcibly confine and imprison one R. with intént to cause said R, to be secretly confined and imprisoned in the county and State against his will. The second count charges that the four defendants without lawful authority did confine, inveigle and kidnap one R. with intent to cause him to be secretly confined and imprisoned in the county and State against his will.' Ih the third count it is alleged the four defendants did without lawful authority forcibly and secretly confine and imprison another person, to-wit: one R. within this State against his will, and did confine and inveigle and kidnap another person, to-wit: one R. with intent to cause him, the said R. to be secretly confined and imprisoned in this State against his will. The defendants severally pleaded not guilty to each and all of the counts of the indictment. One of the defendants failed to appear and the trial proceeded against three of the defendants. The jury found the plaintiffs in error “guilty as charged in the third count of the indictment and Henry Green not guilty as charged. ’ ’ Motions in arrest of judgment and for new trial were denied, sentence was imposed, and writ of error was taken.
“The motion in arrest of judgment is evidenced to this court only in and by the bill of exceptions, when it is matter of record and should have been included in the record proper in the case, and we are not authorized to recognize it when so presented. Caldwell v. State, 43 Fla. 545, 30 South, Rep. 814, and cases there cited.” Kelly v. State, 44 Fla. 441, text 448, 33 South. Rep. 235; Massey v. State, 50 Fla. 109, 39 South. Rep. 790.
Upon grounds of the motion for new trial, it is contended that the conviction on the third count of the indictment is not authorized by the law in view of the statute defining the offenses charged and of the acquittal of the defendants on the first two counts by specifically finding them guilty under the third count only.
The statute is as follows:
“Whoever without lawful authority forcibly or secretly confines or imprisons another person within this State against his will, or confines or inveigles or kidnaps another person, with intent to cause him to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this State against his will, or to cause him tó be sent ont of this State against bis will; and whoever sells, or in any manner transfers, for any term, the service or labor of any other person who has been unlawfully seized, taken, inveigled or kidnapped from this State to any other State, place or county, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding ten years.” Sec. 5057 Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920.
Regarding the third count of the indictment as charging two offenses under the statute, such offenses are similar and the allegations as to them are not repugnant or duplicitous.
When a statute makes either of two or more distinct acts connected with the same general offense, and subject to the same punishment, indictable as distinct crimes, they may when committed by the same person at the same time be coupled in one count and constitute but one offense. Smith v. State, 40 Fla. 203, 23 South. Rep. 854.
There is ample evidence to sustain the verdict as found, the intent being inferred from the character of the illegal acts clearly shown; and even if testimony objected to was not proper to show motive or for other purposes of the trial, the convincing nature of the testimony as to guilt under the statute and the indictment, makes technical errors, if any, in any of the proceedings at the trial harmless, or not so “prejudicial as to justify a new trial,” (Brooks v. United States, U. S., Sup. Ct. Rep., decided March 9, 1925; Hopkins v. State, 52 Fla. 39, 42 South. Rep. 52), therefore the judgment should be and is affirmed.
West, C. J., and Ellis, Beowne and Teeeell, J. J. concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Miles v. State, 160 Fla. 523 (Fla. 1948)…two crimes, inconsistent in character, are charged in a single count, in violation of the rule condemning duplicity. That position is untenable. The style employed in drafting the information has been approved by this Court. See Billings v. State, 89 Fla. 309, 103 So. 628 (1925); Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89, 112 A.L.R. 1013 (1939); Holden v. State, 136 Fla. 880, 187 So. 781 (1939). Next, appellant argued that there was no proof of the corpus delicti when the trial court permitted “confes…
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Ogden King, Jr. v. State, 545 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…e caselaw on this point clearly establishes that a single count may contain multiple methods of committing the same offense. See Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937); Croft v. State, 109 Fla. 188, 146 So. 649 (1933); Billings v. State, 89 Fla. 309, 103 So. 628 (1925); Bean v. State, 469 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). We reject King’s claim that the indictment in this case was legally flawed because the state alleged that death was caused intentionally by both providing cocaine and causing ne…
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Bryon Elliott Stratton v. State, 77 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1955)…idnap. For it has been held in respect to convictions under this law, Sec. 805.01, Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., that the intent to kidnap and confine, etc., may be “inferred from the character of the illegal acts clearly shown.” Billings v. State, 89 Fla. 309, 103 So. 628, 629. Thus the jury, upon the facts before it, was warranted in concluding that appellant had the requisite intent, and that he committed an “overt act apparently adapted to effect that intent, carried beyond mere preparation, but falli…
Authorities Cited
- Hopkins v. State, 52 Fla. 39 (Fla. 1906)
- Smith v. State, 40 Fla. 203 (Fla. 1898)
- Caldwell v. State, 43 Fla. 545 (Fla. 1901)
- Kelly v. State, 44 Fla. 441 (Fla. 1902)
- Will Massey v. State, 50 Fla. 109 (Fla. 1905)