MOSES GREEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1999-02-19
No. 98-1902
PETERSON and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
727 So. 2d 349 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Moses Green, a former juvenile offender, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his 1991 plea to second-degree murder. The court affirmed, holding that Green's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations for Rule 3.850 motions and could not be revived through a habeas corpus petition.


Holding

The court held that Green's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations for Rule 3.850 post-conviction motions and that Green could not circumvent this limitation by recharacterizing his claims as a habeas corpus petition. The petition did not fall within any of the three recognized exceptions to the time limit.


Headnotes

[1] A petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent the time limitations applicable to motions for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850.

[2] Claims that a plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered must be raised within the time limits prescribed by Rule 3.850.

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Key Quotes

“Green cannot escape the two year time limit by recasting his pleading as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”

Establishes that habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent Rule 3.850's limitations period.

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1991, Green was charged as a juvenile with second-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm. He entered a plea of no contest to the murder cha…

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Opinion of the Court
W. SHARP, J.

Green appeals from an order of the trial court denying his petition for a writ of habe-as corpus. We affirm.

In 1991, Green (then a juvenile) was charged with second degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm. He pled no contest to the murder charge and the state nol prossed the robbery charge. He was adjudicated, as an adult.,and sentenced to eighteen years in prison, followed by ten years probation.

In 1993 and 1994, Green filed post-conviction relief motions which were summarily denied. One was appealed and affirmed. Green v. State, 626 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

This petition for habeas corpus was filed in 1998. One ground for this petition is the allegation that the trial court erred in accepting his plea without ensuring on the record that he knowingly, voluntarily and intelli gently waived his rights as a juvenile under chapter 39. Another ground is that the plea was entered involuntarily.

However, both of these grounds could have and should have been raised pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(a). Further, this rule has a two year time limit in which to raise such claims. Green cannot escape the two year time limit by recasting his pleading as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Isley v. State, 652 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Green has far exceeded this time limit, and even if timely, the petition is successive. Mills v. Dugger, 574 So. 2d 63 (Fla.1990); Johnson v. State, 680 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Mason v. State, 627 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

Rule 3.850 recognizes three exceptions to the time limit — a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law, where the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, and where the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided, and the right applies retroactively. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). But Green’s claims in this case do not fit within any of these exceptions. See Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 951, 114 S.Ct. 398, 126 L.Ed.2d 346 (1993).

AFFIRMED.

PETERSON and ANTOON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Collins v. State, 859 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
    …ve assistance of trial counsel and the involuntariness of a plea, are generally not appropriate for habeas corpus proceedings. Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 668 n. 13 (Fla.2000); Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1992); Green v. State, 727 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); King v. State, 695 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Leichtman; Finley v. State, 394 So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“[T]he remedy of habeas corpus is not available as a substitute for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850…
  • Bermudez v. State, 870 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
    …hin two years after the judgment and sentence become final. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). A criminal defendant may not escape this two-year limit for 3.850 motions by styling a pleading as a [*877] petition for writ of habeas corpus. Green v. State, 727 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); see also Patterson v. State, 664 So. 2d 31, 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (affirming denial of petition for habeas corpus where it was apparent defendant was merely seeking untimely motion for 3.850 relief). Bermudez’s first appea…

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