LINDELL MOTORS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
FLOYD MORGAN AND DIANA MORGAN, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Lindell Motors appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate a clerk's default entered against it in a consumer collection practices action. The court reverses, holding that Lindell exercised appropriate diligence in promptly moving to set aside the default and provided a credible explanation (clerical error) for its failure to timely respond, entitling it to have the claims resolved on the merits.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate. A party that exercises appropriate diligence in seeking to set aside a default and provides a credible excuse for failing to timely answer is entitled to have the claims resolved on the merits rather than face entry of a default judgment.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to vacate a default when the movant acts with diligence and provides a credible excuse for failing to timely respo…
[2] An appellate court exercises greater circumspection when reviewing an order denying a motion to set aside a default, as opposed to an order granting such a motion.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“These rules implement the principle of liberality in setting aside defaults so that lawsuits may be decided on their merits.”
Establishes the fundamental policy that defaults should be liberally set aside to ensure cases are decided on their merits rather than procedural technicalities.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFloyd and Diana Morgan contracted to purchase a vehicle from Lindell Motors but a dispute arose over the down payment obligation. Lindell referred the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
CASANUEVA, Judge.
Lindell Motors, Inc., appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate the default entered against it. We determine that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the default and reverse.
Floyd and Diana Morgan contracted to purchase a vehicle from Lindell. Subsequently a dispute arose over the Morgans’ obligation to pay a down payment sum. The Morgans denied liability, and Lindell turned the debt claim over to a collection agency. Ultimately, the Morgans sued Lindell, asserting a violation of Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices Act, section 559.72, Florida Statutes (1997), and libel per se. Lindell was served with the complaint on April 28, 1998. Upon motion, a clerk’s default was entered against Lindell on May 27,1997.
On June 1, 1997, Lindell moved to set aside the default, concurrently filing a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, a motion for more definite statement. Lindell later amended both motions. In August, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to vacate, as well as a later motion for rehearing. A final default judgment was never entered.
Rule 1.500(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, vests the trial court with discretion to set aside a default. In determining whether to exercise this power the court is required to consider several factors, among which is the diligence exercised by the mov-ant in seeking relief. See Garcia Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Diaz, 351 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
In reviewing an order denying a motion to set aside a default, rather than a default judgment, an appellate court may exercise greater circumspection in the review process, see Hunt Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Crum, 598 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); and a party seeking to overturn an order denying a motion to vacate a default is held to a lesser standard than is required of a party seeking to overturn an order granting the same motion, see Marshall Davis, Inc. v. Incapco, Inc., 558 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
These rules implement the principle of liberality in setting aside defaults so that lawsuits may be decided on their merits. See Bland v. Viking Fire Protection, Inc. of the Southeast, 454 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
We begin by observing that Lindell exercised appropriate diligence in seeking to set aside the default. The motion to vacate was filed less than one week after the entry of the default. In an accompanying affidavit, Lindell asserted that its failure to file a timely response was due to clerical error in routing the complaint from corporate staff to its attorneys. A litigant who timely moves to set aside a default, asserting a credible explanation of human error, is entitled to be heard on the merits. See Somero v. Hendry General Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
We conclude that Lindell has met its burden to set aside the default by acting with diligence and by providing a credible excuse for failing to timely answer the complaint.
Accordingly, Lindell should be permitted to have the claims against it resolved on the merits. Our decision, however, should not be interpreted as tacit concurrence with Lin-dell’s claim, asserted in the trial court, that it is a corporation unfamiliar with litigation procedures.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the default.
PARKER, C.J., and WHATLEY, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Geer v. David Neal Jacobsen, Brian James Almengual, & Almengual & Warner, P.A., 880 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…Garcia Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Diaz, 351 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Because the trial court granted relief, a higher standard is applied to overturn the decision than if the trial court had denied the motions. Lindell Motors, Inc. v. Morgan, 727 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Marshall Davis, Inc. v. Incapco, Inc., 558 So. 2d 206, 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). We recognize, as did the trial judge, that there is a strong preference for lawsuits to be determined on the merits and that courts should libe…
-
Coquina Beach Club Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner, 813 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…r handling the suit papers. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to set aside the default. There is a “principle of liberality in setting aside defaults so that lawsuits may be decided on their merits.” Lindell Motors, Inc. v. Morgan, 727 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). To be relieved of a default, a defendant must demonstrate excusable neglect, a meritorious defense, and due diligence in seeking relief. Ponderosa, Inc. v. Stephens, 539 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In order to es…
-
Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. v. Ronco Inventions, LLC, 890 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…eached without the difficulty that arises from a contest by the defendant.” Id. Florida adheres to a liberal policy with regard to vacating defaults. N. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849, 852-53 (Fla.1962); Lindell Motors, Inc. v. Morgan, 727 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “[I]f there be any reasonable doubt in the matter [of vacating a default], it should be resolved in favor of granting the application and allowing a trial upon the merits of the case.” State Bank of Eau Gallie v. Raymond, 1…1 / 3
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Glenna Somero and Robert Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Garcia Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Diaz, 351 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Marshall Davis, Inc. v. Incapco, Inc., 558 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Bland v. Viking Fire Prot., 454 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Hunt Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Crum, 598 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)