STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
SAMMY COTTON, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's refusal to impose enhanced sentences under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, arguing the trial court lacked discretion once the prosecutor sought such sentences. The court held that the trial court retains sentencing discretion when statutory exceptions apply and that fact-finding regarding exceptions is the trial court's responsibility, not the prosecutor's.
The trial court retains sentencing discretion when the record supports one of the statute's exceptions to enhanced sentencing. The trial court, not the prosecutor, has the responsibility to determine the facts and exercise the discretion permitted by the statute regarding the applicability of exceptions.
[1] A trial court retains sentencing discretion when the record supports an exception to the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act.
[2] The determination of facts supporting an exception to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is a fact-finding function of the trial court, not the prosecutor.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude the trial court retains sentencing discretion when the record supports one of the statute's exceptions to the enhanced sentencing.”
States the core holding regarding the trial court's discretionary authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSammy Cotton committed or attempted to commit enumerated felonies within three years of being released from a state correctional facility, making him …
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BLUE, Judge.
The State appeals the habitual offender sentences imposed on Sammy Cotton and argues that the trial court erred by failing to impose further enhanced sentences pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. See § 775.082(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). The State contends that once the prosecutor decides to seek an enhanced sentence and establishes that the defendant is qualified under the statute, the trial court has no discretion and is required to sentence in accordance with the prison releasee reoffender statute. We conclude the trial court retains sentencing discretion when the record supports one of the statute’s exceptions to the enhanced sentencing. Because the record supports the trial court’s finding that an exception exists in this case, we affirm.
A defendant who commits, or attempts to commit, one of certain enumerated felonies within three years of being released from a state correctional facility is a “prison releasee reoffender.” See § 775.082(8)(a)1. The statute provides for lengthy mandatory sentences for such defendants. Subsection 775.082(8)(d)1 sets out four circumstances or exceptions which make the mandatory sentence discretionary. The State argues that the prosecutor, not the trial judge, possesses the discretion to determine the applicability of the four circumstances. We conclude the statute does not support the State’s interpretation.
Since the 1997 adoption of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, no reported appellate case has dealt with the issue presented here. We conclude that the applicability of the exceptions set out in subsection (d) involves a fact-finding function. We hold that the trial court, not the prosecutor, ,has the responsibility to determine the facts and to exercise the discretion permitted by the statute. Historically, fact-finding and discretion in sentencing have been the prerogative of the trial court. Had the legislature wished to transfer this exercise of judgment to the office of the state attorney, it would have done so in unequivocal terms.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that “the victim does not want the offender to receive the mandatory prison sentence and provided a written statement to that effect.” Because section 775.082(8)(d) provides this as one of the authorized exceptions to imposition of the mandatory sentence, we affirm.
Affirmed.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By (57 total)
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State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)…LEWIS, J. We have for review State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), and Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999),1 both involving the Prison Releasee Reof-fender Act, chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida, codified in part in former section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)(the “Act”).2 In C…
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Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…paration of powers clause. The district courts of appeal which have addressed the question of whether the Act removes all sentencing discretion from the trial judge have reached differing conclusions. Compare State v. Cotton, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D18, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (concluding “that the trial court, not the prosecutor, has the responsibility to determine the facts and to exercise the discretion permitted by the statute”), with McKnight v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D439, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3…
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McKNIGHT v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000)…LEWIS, J. We have for review McKnight v. State, 727 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), in which the Third District affirmed the decision of the trial court and certified conflict with State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). We have jurisdiction. See V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently held that the Prisoner Re-leasee Reoffender Act does not violate separation of powers, and rejected other constitutional challen…
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