ROBERT HARGRAVE, APPELLANT,
v.
SUSAN N. HARGRAVE, APPELLEE
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In a post-judgment dispute over a qualified domestic relations order, the court determines the proper interpretation of a property settlement agreement clause regarding pension plan distribution. The Fourth District reverses the lower court's award to the wife, holding that she is entitled only to one-half of pension plan amounts accruing during the marriage plus income thereon, but not passive accumulations on the husband's pre-marital interest.
The clause does not include passive accumulations on the husband's pre-marital interest. The wife should receive one-half only of amounts actually accruing during the marriage plus income on those amounts; the phrase 'and income thereon' modifies 'accruing during the marriage' and excludes passive growth attributable to the husband's non-marital portion.
[1] A property settlement agreement incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution of marriage is interpreted according to principles of contract law.
[2] When interpreting a contract, every provision must be given meaning and effect, and apparent inconsistencies should be reconciled if possible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the contract language clearly says that which the statute would otherwise have required absent agreement”
Establishes that contract interpretation, not statutory default rules, governs the dispute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' property settlement agreement, incorporated in their divorce judgment, provided for the wife to receive one-half of the pension plan 'acc…
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OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge.
The parties’ property settlement agreement, incorporated in the final judgment dissolving the marriage, provided for the wife to receive one-half of that part of the husband’s pension plan “accruing during the marriage and income thereon.” A post-judgment dispute as to the proper construction of this clause resulted in the court entering a qualified domestic relations order from which the husband has appealed.
The plan had a value of $7,460 when the parties married, and a value of $120,650 at the time of dissolution.1 On the wife’s application for a qualified domestic relations order, the court awarded her one-half the difference in these two amounts (less a separate contractual adjustment not relevant here). The effect of that order was to award the wife one-half of the pension plan’s enhancement in value during the marriage. The husband contends on this appeal that the court’s distribution erroneously deprived him of the passive accumulations on his pre-mari-tal interest in the plan, contrary to the clear language of the parties’ agreement. We agree, and reverse.
We recognize that the issue here is to be decided under principles of contract interpretation, not by the statutory scheme of section 61.075(5)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1995), or else we would simply reverse on the authority of Blase v. Blase, 704 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Nonetheless, we think it clear that the contract language clearly says that which the statute would otherwise have required absent agreement. The contract language provides for the wife to receive “one-half of that part [of the pension plan] accruing during the marriage and income thereon.” Had the agreement intended to distribute to the wife one-half of all amounts accruing during the marriage, regardless of source, then the inclusion of the words “and income thereon” would be mere surplusage. Every provision in a contract should be given meaning and effect, and apparent inconsistencies reconciled if possible. Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store, 369 So. 2d 938 (Fla.1979). In order to give meaning to the words “and income thereon,” we hold that they refer to the amounts “accruing during the marriage.” Thus, the distribution to the wife should not have included any part of the enhancement in value during the marriage which was due to passive accumulations on the husband’s non-marital portion of the pension plan. The husband proffered evidence as to how such amount could be calculated, but the court considered it not relevant.
We reverse the qualified domestic relations order and remand for further consideration consistent herewith. The court may, in its discretion, take additional evidence to aid it in entering a new qualified domestic relations order. REVERSED.
POLEN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . The parties make no issue of either the values or the valuation dates.
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- Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park BAR & Package Store, 369 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1979)
- Blase v. Blase, 704 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)