BRIAN RIX, PETITIONER,
v.
KEN JENNE, AS SHERIFF OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA AND STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS
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Petitioner Brian Rix challenged the revocation of his bond without a new bond hearing following his arrest on new charges. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal held that while a trial court may revoke bond for breach of conditions, it must follow statutory requirements under section 907.041 to deny bond, requiring specific findings about danger to the community and defendant's criminal history.
The trial court's authority to deny bond is circumscribed by section 907.041, which requires specific findings even when a defendant breaches a bond condition by committing new crimes. The state must prove the defendant poses a substantial probability of threat to the community and meet additional statutory criteria regarding the defendant's criminal history or current status before detention is authorized.
[1] A trial court's authority to deny bond pending trial is circumscribed by statute, even when a defendant breaches a bond condition by committing new criminal charges.
[2] Pretrial detention following a bond breach requires a finding that the defendant poses a substantial probability of harm to the community.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court's authority to deny bond pending trial is "circumscribed by the provisions of Florida Statute section 907.041."”
Establishes that trial court discretion in bond denial is limited by statute, even when defendant breaches conditions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRix's bond on pending charges of battery on a law enforcement officer, possession of cocaine, and driving under the influence was revoked after his ar…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Brian Rix’s bond on pending charges of battery on a law enforcement officer, possession of cocaine, and driving under the influence was revoked following his arrest for new criminal charges of possession of cocaine and driving under the influence. Rix filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to set a new bond following revocation of the initial bond. We agree and grant the writ. See Paul v. Jenne, 24 Fla.L. Weekly D581, 728 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Merdian v. Cochran, 654 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
This court in Paul outlined the applicable rules and statutes and continued to hold that the trial court’s authority to deny bond pending trial is “circumscribed by the provisions of Florida Statute section 907.041.” This court further held that such rule applies even in the face of the defendant’s breach of a condition of bond involving new criminal charges. See Paul, 24 Fla.L. Weekly at D583, 728 So. 2d at 1171.
In short, the trial court may order pretrial detention upon the breach of a bond condition if it finds a substantial probability that the defendant poses a threat of harm to the community. Section 907.041(4)(b)(4) provides that the court can make such finding of “threat of harm” if it finds that the defendant is presently charged with a dangerous crime, that there is a substantial probability that the defendant committed such crime, that the factual circumstances of the crime indicate a disregard for the safety of the community, and that there are no conditions of release reasonably sufficient to protect the community from the risk of physical harm to persons. See § 907.041(4)(b)(4), Fla.Stat. (1997),
In addition, subsection 4 provides that the court must find that at least one of the following conditions is also present: a. The defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.
b. The defendant has been convicted of a dangerous crime within the 10 years immediately preceding the date of his or her arrest for the crime presently charged,
e. The defendant is on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of sentence or on pretrial release for a dangerous crime at the time of the current arrest.
See Paul, 24 Fla.L. Weekly at D581-82, 728 So. 2d at 1168, 1999 WL 104585.
We find that the state did not satisfy its burden of proving the requirements for pre-trial detention in accordance with section 907.041. Accordingly, we grant the writ and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this court’s holdings in Paul. See also Merdian v. Cochran, 654 So. 2d 573. As in Paul, we certify conflict with Houser v. Manning, 719 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
Clerk is directed to issue mandate concurrently with this opinion.
GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur. GROSS, J., dissents without opinion
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State v. Paul, 783 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 2001)…z v. Neumann, 731 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (pretrial detention is inappropriate after defendant breaches conditions of release, unless the State proves at least one of the four circumstances listed in section 907.041(4)(b)); Rix v. Jenne, 728 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (granting writ of habeas corpus where State did not satisfy its burden of proving requirements for pretrial deten [*1051] tion upon breach of bond), review granted, 744 So. 2d 452 (1999). We agree with the reasoning of Paul. The…
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Bradshaw v. Jenne, 754 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…a. This court has consistently held that a denial of bond after a bond revocation must be based on a showing of the need for pretrial detention, pursuant to the criteria in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, and rules 3.131 and 3.132. Rix v. Jenne, 728 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Paul v. Jenne, 728 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Lepore v. Jenne, 708 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Blackman v. State, 707 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Surdovel v. Jenne, 706 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Dupree v. Coc…
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Jenne v. RIX, 783 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 2001)…PARIENTE, J. We have for review the decision in Rix v. Jenne, 728 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with Houser v. Manning, 719 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed in State v. Paul, 783…
Authorities Cited
- Merdian v. Cochran, 654 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Paul v. Jenne, 728 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Houser v. Manning, 719 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)