THE CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, PETITIONER,
v.
DAN MARELLI, MARILYN DEWEY, WILLIAM AND SHARON KADOW, LAWRENCE AND LYNN KENDRICK, AND ELIZABETH DOERR, RESPONDENTS
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The Board of Adjustment of St. Petersburg sought certiorari review of a circuit court decision that had granted certiorari and invalidated a parking variance granted to Compro Corporation for a laundromat and restaurant. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding the Board's variance was not supported by competent, substantial evidence.
The circuit court properly applied the correct legal standard for certiorari review and correctly found the Board's variance decision unsupported by competent, substantial evidence regarding reasonable use. Neighboring property owners have standing to challenge zoning actions, and the property owner is not an indispensable party to such a challenge.
[1] A circuit court reviewing an administrative action by writ of certiorari must determine whether the agency action afforded procedural due process, whether the essential r…
[2] An appellate court reviewing a circuit court's grant of certiorari in an administrative matter may only determine whether the circuit court afforded procedural due proces…
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Defines the limited scope of appellate review of circuit court certiorari decisions reviewing administrative actions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1995, the Board of Adjustment granted Compro Corporation a parking variance to reduce required parking spaces from fourteen to seven for a proposed…
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PER CURIAM.
The Board of Adjustment (Board) of the City of St. Petersburg filed a petition for writ of certiorari requesting this court to review a grant of certiorari by the circuit court in a zoning variance matter. The property owner for whom the variance was granted, Compro Corporation, has filed a motion to intervene as an indispensable party in this action. Both the petition for certiorari and the motion to intervene are denied.
In 1995 the Board granted a parking variance that would enable Compro Corporation to put a laundromat and restaurant in a recently purchased building. The city code required fourteen parking spaces for this use, but the Board granted a variance to permit Compro Corporation to provide just seven spaces.
Neighboring property owners timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court challenging the Board’s decision. The petition was granted by order entered September 28, 1998. The circuit court found that the decision of the Board was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The court found that no competent evidence supported an essential criterion for granting a variance, i.e., that refusal to grant the variancé would deprive the owner of reasonable use of its property.
The circuit court applied the proper standard for certiorari review of an administrative action set out in Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995). The court considered: 1) whether the agency action afforded the parties procedural due process; 2) whether the essential requirements of law were observed; and, 3) whether the agency action is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
This court may review only “whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law.” Id. In its petition, the Board challenges the court’s finding that no competent, substantial evidence supported the required finding that without the variance the owner would be deprived of reasonable use of its property. However, the Board has not identified any denial of procedural due process or incorrect application of the law by the circuit court. Instead, the Board is asking this court to review the circuit court’s interpretation of the evidence and its application of the term “reasonable.”
The Board and Compro Corporation also challenge the omission of the property owner, Compro Corporation, as a party to the litigation. This challenge is without merit. In Brigham v. Dade County, 305 So. 2d 756 (Fla.1974), the court found that a party challenging an administrative action concerning a zoning regulation change need not join the affected property owner as a respondent in a petition for writ of certiorari. Consequently, Compro Corporation is not an indispensable party to this action.
The Board questions the standing of the neighboring property owners to bring this action. A multitude of cases recognize that neighboring property owners affected by zoning changes have standing to challenge the changes. See Rinker Materials Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 528 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), and cases cited therein. Petition denied, and motion to intervene denied.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and BLUE and GREEN, JJ., Concur.
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Thomas v. Suwannee Cnty., 734 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…per disposition of the appeal. . We express no opinion on the propriety of this ruling, which is not before us. The Second District recently addressed a related issue in City of St. Petersburg Board of Adjustment v. Marelli, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D668, 728 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). . As objectors, they never applied for a development order themselves. Cf. Parker v. Leon County, 627 So. 2d 476, 479-80 (Fla.1993) (holding applicant’s remedy was to petition for writ of certiorari); Florida Inst. of Tech. v. M…
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Highwoods DLF Eola, LLC v. Condo Developer, LLC, 51 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…indispensable party by virtue of the holdings in Brigham v. Dade County, 305 So. 2d 756 (Fla.1974); Concerned Citizens of Bayshore Community v. Lee County, 923 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); and City of St. Petersburg, Bd. of Adjustment v. Marelli, 728 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In Brigham, the Florida Supreme Court held that a property owner and zoning change applicant was not an indispensable party to a certiorari action filed to challenge a county’s approval of the applicant’s requested zoning change…
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Windward Marina, L.L.C. v. City OF Destin & The Destin City Council, 743 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…parties in the proceedings below procedural due process. See Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995); Martin County v. City of Stuart, 736 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(en banc); City of St. Petersburg v. Marelli, 728 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); City of Jacksonville Beach v. Marisol, 706 So. 2d 354, 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d 598, 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). While the circuit court’s review of the city’s denial of the de…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Leila Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)
- Brigham v. Dade Cnty., 305 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1974)
- Rinker Materials Corp. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 528 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)