ANTONIO DEVON GOODMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Affirmed conviction for felon in possession of firearm; police had reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop based on reliable confidential informant information, and defendant voluntarily consented to vehicle search.
Police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on reliable confidential informant information, and the defendant's voluntary consent to search the vehicle was valid.
[1] Reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop may be based on information from a documented confidential informant whose accuracy has been established.
[2] Voluntary consent to search a vehicle may be established by preponderance of evidence following a lawful investigatory stop.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after a firearm was discovered during a stop and search of his vehicle.…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant was convicted and sentenced for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On this appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm because it was discovered during an unlawful investigative stop and search of the automobile that he was driving.
However, given the totality of the factual circumstances of this case, particularly the accuracy of the information supplied to the police by its documented confidential informant, we conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the appellant’s vehicle. See Silva v. State, 641 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); State v. Hadden, 629 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Hopkins v. State, 524 So. 2d 1136, 1137-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Additionally, a preponderance of the evidence before the trial court sufficiently established that the appellant freely and voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle once it was validly stopped by the police. See Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla.1992); Thames v. State, 592 So. 2d 733, 735-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). We therefore find no error in the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1992)
- State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Thames v. State, 592 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- State v. Hadden, 629 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Hopkins v. State, 524 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Silva v. State, 641 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)