KENNEDY A. POWNALL, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, AND PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC., APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1999-03-24
No. 98-3021
POLEN, SHAHOOD, JJ., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur.
729 So. 2d 479 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Mr. Pownall appeals a denial of unemployment compensation benefits after he was incarcerated by the INS and failed to return to work before his deferred employment status expired. The Fourth District affirms the Unemployment Appeals Commission's decision, holding that the appeals referee's factual findings—that Pownall contacted his employer about returning to work after his deferred status had lapsed—were supported by competent, substantial evidence.


Holding

Affirmed. The appeals referee's factual findings that Pownall contacted his employer about returning to work after November 8, 1996—thus after his deferred status expired—were supported by competent, substantial evidence and properly supported the denial of benefits.


Headnotes

[1] An unemployment compensation claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits if they voluntarily leave employment without cause.

[2] The credibility of witnesses and the resolution of conflicting evidence are matters within the sole purview of the trier of fact.

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Key Quotes

“Judging the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are matters solely within the purview of the trier of fact.”

Establishes the standard of review for factual findings—the court defers to the fact-finder's credibility determinations.

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Facts & Procedural History

Pownall failed to report for work on August 8, 1996, because he had been incarcerated by the INS. His supervisor gave him deferred employment status u…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The claimant, Mr. Pownall, appeals a final order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC) affirming a decision of the appeals referee which denied Pownall’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits. Denial was based on the appeals referee’s conclusion that claimant had voluntarily left employment without cause, and therefore was not entitled to benefits. We affirm.

The appeals referee’s factual findings are summarized as follows: Claimant failed to come to work on August 8, 1996, but later that day called his supervisor and explained that he had been incarcerated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The employer voluntarily gave claimant a deferred status until November 8, 1996. After claimant failed to return to his employment by November 8, the employer filled the position. When claimant reported for work at a subsequent date no openings were available.

Mr. Pownall’s sole argument is that the factual findings are wrong. He grounds this on the assertion that at the hearing he “had made it clear” to the appeals referee that he had been released by INS on September 30, 1996, and had reported to work within 48 hours thereafter, a time well within the deferred status period. What this argument overlooks, however, is the testimony of claimant’s supervisor that when Mr. Pownall contacted him and said he was available to work again, it was after November 8, 1996, and by then claimant’s deferred status had lapsed. Judging the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are matters solely within the purview of the trier of fact. See Andrus v. Florida Dep’t of Labor and Employment Sec., 379 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Heifetz v. Department of Bus. Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The UAC was required to affirm the factual findings of the appeals referee if there was competent, substantial evidence in the record to support those findings. See Fink v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 665 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). As recited above, there was such evidence, and the UAC’s order is, therefore, affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

POLEN, SHAHOOD, JJ., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur.


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Cited By

  • …the tape itself was not admitted into evidence. [*168] The UAC must affirm the factual findings of the appeals referee if there was competent, substantial evidence in the record to support those findings. See Pownall v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 729 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Under section 120.57(l)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, but hearsay alone is insufficient to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in a civil a…
  • Bagenstos v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 927 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …from receiving benefits. A referee’s factual findings cannot be disturbed if supported by competent substantial evidence. Jackson v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 730 So. 2d 719, 721 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Pownall v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 729 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). An appeals court cannot overturn the decision of the Unemployment Appeals Commission unless it determines that there is a lack of competent, substantial evidence in the record to support its action. Doyle v. Fla. Unemployme…

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