C.B., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1999-04-16
No. 98-1265
BENTON AND PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.
729 So. 2d 538 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

C.B., a juvenile sentenced to community control, appeals after the trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence for violating the conditions of community control. The Florida appellate court reversed because juvenile law limits sanctions to one year from the original sentence or the child's 19th birthday, whichever comes first.


Holding

The trial court properly retained jurisdiction because the violation petition was filed within one year of the original sentence, timely initiating revocation proceedings. However, the imposed indeterminate sentence was improper; a juvenile can only be sentenced for a period ending one year from the original sentence or the child's 19th birthday, whichever first occurs.


Headnotes

[1] A juvenile's admission to violating community control does not waive the issue of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.

[2] A trial court retains subject matter jurisdiction to revoke community control if the affidavit alleging a violation is filed within the statutory period following the ori…

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Key Quotes

“We agree with appellant that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.”

Establishes that jurisdictional defects in juvenile cases cannot be waived by agreement, even if the defendant consented to potential further sentencing.

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Facts & Procedural History

On February 27, 1997, C.B. was sentenced to community control following his plea to two first-degree misdemeanors. On February 17, 1998, the state fil…

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Opinion of the Court
VAN NORTWICK, J.

C.B., a juvenile, appeals a disposition order committing him to a moderate risk facility for an indeterminate period of time based upon appellant’s admission that he violated the conditions of community control. Because the trial court erred in imposing an indeterminate sentence, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

On February 27, 1997, C.B. was sentenced to community control following a plea to two first degree misdemeanors. On February 17, 1998, the state filed a petition for violation of community control pursuant to section 985.231(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1997). Although appellant admitted the violation at the sentencing hearing on March 13, 1998, appellant argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him further because such sentence would be imposed more than a year after the date of his original community control sentence. The trial court rejected appellant’s argument, finding that appellant had waived any subject matter jurisdiction claim because appellant had agreed at the time of the original sentencing that, if he did not successfully complete the assigned drug program, he would be subject to a moderate risk sentence.

We agree with appellant that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Francois v. State, 695 So. 2d 695 (Fla.1997). Nevertheless, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction because the affidavit alleging a violation of community control was filed on February 12, 1998, which was within one year of imposition of the original sentence. Thus, the process of revocation was set in motion in a timely fashion. See T.M.B. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), approved, 716 So. 2d 269 (Fla.1998); and see Tyson v. State, 655 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and Hoffman v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D566, 729 So. 2d 421, 1999 WL 73696 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb.18, 1999).

However, we must reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing because, as the appellee correctly concedes, the appellant could not be sentenced for a period of time beyond one year or appellant’s 19th birthday, whichever first occurs. See M.J.P. v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2090, - So. 2d -, 1997 WL 536011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), approved, 717 So. 2d 459 (Fla.1998). In re-sentencing on remand, appellant is entitled to credit for the time he spent in secure detention awaiting disposition of the petition alleging a violation of community control. See E.R. v. State, 584 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).

REVERSED and REMANDED for farther proceedings.

BENTON AND PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.


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Citator

Cited By

  • J.I.S. v. State, 902 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
    …(Fla. 4th DCA 1999), J.B. v. State, 829 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and C.C. v. State, 841 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), we certify conflict. BARFIELD, J., concurs, and BENTON, J., concurs in judgment with opinion. . See e.g., C.B. v. State, 729 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding juvenile could not be committed for a period beyond one year or his 19th birthday, whichever came first); D.L.J. v. State, 765 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding disposition in juvenile case is limited to the maximu…
  • J.T. v. State, 816 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …vidence of value of stolen property). We also reverse and remand the order of disposition. As the state concedes, J.T. was entitled to credit for time served in secure detention. See L.K v. State, 729 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); C.B. v. State, 729 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); E.R. v. State, 584 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). GUNTHER, STONE, and GROSS, JJ., concur. . Section 812.014(3)(a) provides: Theft of any property not specified in subsection (2) is petit theft of the second degree and a misde…

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