CLAUDIA DANIELEWICZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Claudia Danielewicz was stopped by police while asleep in a parked car at a mall parking lot at 1:30 a.m., resulting in DUI charges. The court reversed the denial of her motion to suppress, finding the detention violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not based on a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity.
The court held that the investigative stop was unlawful because the officer lacked a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity. Although an order to exit a vehicle constitutes a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protection, the officer's suspicion that Danielewicz might be intoxicated based solely on her being asleep in her car was insufficient, especially since the officer acknowledged that people sleep in cars without criminal implication.
[1] An encounter between a police officer and a citizen becomes an investigative stop when the citizen is asked to exit a vehicle.
[2] To justify an investigative stop, an officer must have a well-founded suspicion that the subject of the stop is or is about to become involved in criminal activity.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to justify an investigative stop, the officer must have a well-founded suspicion that the subject of the stop is or is about to become involved in criminal activity.”
Establishes the legal standard required to justify an investigative stop under Fourth Amendment law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn July 4, 1997, at 1:30 a.m., Officer Wierzba observed Danielewicz's car parked legally in a mall parking lot with the headlights on and engine runni…
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PER CURIAM.
Claudia Danielewicz challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence of intoxication obtained during a traffic stop.1 We reverse because the detention of Danielewicz by police was not based on a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity.
At 1:30 a.m. on July 4,1997, Officer Robert Wierzba (Wierzba) of the Clearwater Police Department pulled into the parking lot of the Clearwater Mall near the Bombay Bicycle Club, a restauranl/bar located on Gulf to Bay Boulevard. Wierzba testified that this was not a high crime area, and the bar was open for business. There were other cars parked in the lot. Wierzba saw Danielewicz’s car parked in a legal parking space near the rear of the business. The headlights were on and the engine was running. No traffic infraction was observed by the officer, and he had no reason to believe there was any problem with the vehicle. As Wierzba approached the vehicle, he saw that water was condensing on the windows from the air conditioner. He looked inside the car and saw Danielewiez in the driver’s seat. She appeared to him to be asleep. Wierzba knocked on the window to get her attention. Danielewiez looked at the officer, but did not open her door, which was locked. Wierzba asked Danielewiez to get out of the car. She did not do so until Wierzba had asked her five times. After she unlocked the door and got out of the car, Wierzba gathered evidence which led to her arrest for driving under the influence (DUI).
Danielewiez was charged with felony DUI based on prior offenses similar to Florida’s DUI.
Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence of DUI alleging that the officer’s contact with Danielewiez was an illegal stop. The trial court found that the contact instigated by Wierzba was an investigative stop and that it was lawful. We agree that when Wierzba ordered Danielewiez to get out of the car an investigative stop occurred. The trial court erred, however, in finding that the stop was lawful.
As a general rule, an encounter between a police officer and a citizen becomes an investigative stop when the citizen is asked to exit a vehicle. See Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla.1993); Zelinski v. State, 695 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
In order to justify an investigative stop, the officer must have a well-founded suspicion that the subject of the stop is or is about to become involved in criminal activity. In this case, the officer did not articulate a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity. While the officer suspected that Danielewiez was inebriated because she was asleep in her car, he also stated that people sleep in their ears without criminal implication. The officer did not testify that he was concerned for the driver’s personal health. The actions of Dan-ielewicz were susceptible of being interpreted as innocent conduct; therefore, Wierzba needed additional factors before he could validly stop her.
The State argues that the contact between the officer and the citizen was a mere encounter with no Fourth Amendment implications.
We disagree. The officer repeatedly asked Danielewiez to get out of the car. As the Florida Supreme Court observed in Popple, “[wjhether characterized as a request or an order, we conclude that Deputy Wilmoth’s direction for Popple to exit his vehicle constituted a show of authority which restrained Popple’s freedom of movement because a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he should comply.” 626 So. 2d at 188. Similarly, Wierzba’s instruction to Danielewiez restrained her movements and amounted to a seizure of her person.
Since the investigative stop was not based on a well-founded suspicion, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
NORTHCUTT, A.C.J., CASANUEVA, J., and QUINCE, PEGGY A., ASSOCIATE JUDGE, Concur. . Danielewicz also argues there was insufficient evidence of prior convictions to support a felony DUI sentence. We do not reach this issue based on our disposition of the suppression issue.
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Hrezo v. State, 780 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…safety during the consensual encounter. In this case, there is no dispute that the deputy lacked a well-founded suspicion that Mr. Hrezo had committed or was about to commit a crime when he turned on his emergency lights. See Danielewicz v. State, 730 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding investigative stop, based on officer’s observation of defendant apparently asleep in legally parked car, was improper). The cocaine and drug paraphernalia that the police found in Mr. Hrezo’s car were the fruit of an unla…
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State v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police only observe car legally parked); Shaw v. State, 778 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(same); Brown v. State, 744 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(same); Danielewicz v. State, 730 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police only observe car legally parked in parking lot at 1:30 a.m.); Allen v. State, 703 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police only observe…1 / 2
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Dermio v. State, 112 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…dly held that where an officer orders an individual to exit a vehicle, an investigatory stop occurs. See, e.g., State v. Jimoh, 67 So. 3d 240, 241-42 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Parsons v. State, 825 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Danielewicz v. State, 730 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We have extended that principle to situations where an officer commands an occupant of a car to roll down the window. See Greider, 977 So. 2d at 792-93. However Greider does not control this case because there, during the o…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Zelinski v. State, 695 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)