VICTOR MANUEL QUILES, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Helling v. Bartok, 987 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
  …8) (“A trial court has the discretion to modify alimony effective as of the date of the petition for modification or subsequent thereto, but it cannot modify alimony that was due prior to the filing of the petition.”); see also Burkhart v. Burkhart, 731 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Fenner v. Fenner, 599 So. 2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); § 61.14(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007) (providing that a “court may modify ... alimony by increasing or decreasing the ... alimony retroactively to the date of the fili…
• McQUAIG v. McQUAIG, 36 So. 3d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
  …competent, substantial evidence of what expenses are “ordinary and necessary” to running the Former Husband’s distributorship, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that his 2008 gross income was $120,000. See Burkhart v. Burkhart, 731 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The Former Husband also contends that the modified alimony payment is excessive because it leaves the Former Wife with 80% of the parties’ combined income, and further that the attorney’s fee award is unwarranted because t…
• Dezso Szuri v. Gizella Szuri, 759 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
  …at 1007. Accordingly, the alimony award is reversed, see Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d at 1005, as well as the order requiring the Former Husband to secure the alimony obligation by a mortgage on his commercial properties, see Burkhart v. Burkhart, 731 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In determining the award must be reversed, we have not overlooked the difficulties faced by the trial judge and the fact that the Former Wife misused the post-dissolution proceedings as a weapon for harassment.4 The Former Wife…