LEO SALTERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
LEO SALTERS, APPELLANT,
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
731 So. 2d 826
Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1999)
Negative Treatment
Cited by 48 cases
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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.
We deny appellant’s motion for rehearing. We withdraw this court’s opinion issued on January 27, 1999, and substitute the following:
We affirm appellant’s conviction for strong armed robbery. We also affirm appellant’s sentence as a violent career criminal pursuant to section 775.084(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996). See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla.1993); Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). We hold that appellant’s opportunity to challenge his sentence, based upon the constitutionality of the statute, ended on October 1, 1996. Consequently, appellant lacked standing to challenge this issue, since his offenses occurred on April 27, 1997. “Once reenacted as a portion of the Florida Statutes, a chapter law is no longer subject to challengé on the grounds that it violates the single subject requirement of Article III.” Scott, 721 So. 2d at 1246 (citing Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 2).
We recognize and certify to the Supreme Court that our holding, as to the window of opportunity to challenge the statute, conflicts with Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. granted, 717 So. 2d 538 (Fla.1998).
AFFIRMED.
STONE, C.J., DELL, and STEVENSON, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (46 total)
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Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)…lines at issue here were reenacted in 1996 pursuant to Chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of October 1, 1996, thereby curing the constitutional defect raised in this case.” Bortel, 743 So. 2d at 596 (relying on Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). We note that whether the window period closed on October 1, 1996, or on May 24, 1997, in the present case Heggs would still have standing to raise his single subject rule…
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Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)…t 264 n. 1. Conversely, the Fourth District in Bortel determined that the window period closed on October 1, 1996, when the relevant provisions of chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida, became effective. See 743 So. 2d at 596 (relying on Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). We declined to resolve the conflict regarding the window period in our decision in Heggs, however, because the defendant there had standing to raise a single subject rule…
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State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)…is Court, the parties in Thompson did not dispute the Second District’s determination regarding the applicable window period. While Thompson was pending before this Court, however, the Fourth District [*646] issued its decision in Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826, 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), wherein the court certified conflict with the Second District’s decision in Thompson regarding the window period issue. Specifically, the Salters Court held that the defendant in that case, who committed his offense on Apri…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
- Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- McKinley Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)