HAVILAND, CLARK & CO., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
ROBERT B. HARGIS, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Haviland, Clark & Co. sued Robert B. Hargis on a promissory note executed in Alabama in 1849, but the action was not brought until 1856. Hargis pleaded the statute of limitations, and plaintiffs sought to avoid the bar by claiming Hargis had removed out of the State of Alabama to obstruct the action. The Florida Supreme Court held that the statutory exception to the limitations period applies only to removal from within Florida, not from outside the state.
The court held that the exception to the statute of limitations for removal 'out of the country' or 'out of the county' applies only to removal from within the State of Florida, not to removal from outside Florida. Since both parties were domiciled in Alabama when the cause of action accrued, the removal statute does not prevent the defendant from pleading the statute of limitations defense.
“We are satisfied that the 11th section of the act of November 10, 1828, does not apply to defendants who reside 'out of thé country,' that is out of the State of Florida, when the cause of action accrues.”
Establishes the court's central holding that 'out of the country' means out of Florida, not outside any state.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs executed a promissory note with defendant Hargis in Mobile, Alabama on December 7, 1849, for $232.70. The declaration was not filed until J…
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WALKER, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The declaration in this case was filed to June Term, 1856, in the Circuit Court for Escambia county, on a note, of which the following is a copy, to wit:
Mobile, December 7th, 1849.
One day after date I promise to pay to the order of llaviland, Clark & Go. two hundred and thirty-two 70-100 dollars, value received.
(Signed,) BOBT. B. HABGIS.
The defendant pleaded that none of the causes of action in the declaration mentioned accrued to the plaintiffs at any time within five years next before the commencement of this action.
The plaintiffs replied that the promise sued on by said plaintiffs was made in Mobile, in the State of Alabama, where both plaintiffs and defendant resided, and that after-wards the said defendant then and there obstructed and defeated the said plaintiffs from bringing and maintaining their said action, by the removal of the said defendant out of the State of Alabama.
To this replication the defendant demurred. The parties then submitted the fate of the case to the ruling of the Court on the demurrer. The Court, having taken time to advise thereof, sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment to the defendant for costs.
Plaintiffs then sued out their writ of error. It is contended that the replication. is good under section eleven of our limitation act of November 10, 1828, which reads thus: “ If any person or persons, defendant or defendants to any of the aforesaid actions, shall abscond or conceal themselves, or by removal out of the country or ol‘ the county where lie or they shall or do reside, when such cause of action accrued, or by other indirect ways defeat or obstruct any person or persons who have title thereto from bringing and maintaining all or any of the aforesaid actions within the respective times limited by this act, that then and in such case such defendant or defendants are not to be admitted to plead this act in bar to any of the aforesaid actions,, anything in this act in anywise to the contrary notwithstanding.” Thomp. Dig. 444.
The first section of our act of 1846 (see Thomp. Dig. 443) reads thus: “ "Whereas, doubts have been suggested of the true intent and meaning of the use of the terms, ‘ beyond seas or out of the country,’ used in the several acts of limitations heretofore or now of force in this State-,, for remedy whereof, Be it enacted,, That the saving in the act of November 10th, 1828, and all other acts in favor of persons ‘ beyond the seas or out of the country,’ until such persons shall have returned from beyond the seas, or from without the country, shall not be held, deemed or taken to extend to persons who were at the time of the making of the contract or accruing of the cause of action domiciled or resident within the limits of this State, but all such persons shall be put upon the same footing and shall have no other or greater rights than are possessed by residents and citizens of the State.”
Such is the legislative interpretation which the term “ out of the country” has received in connection with the rights of plaintiffs, and we can see no reason why the same construction shall not prevail when that term is used in connection with the rights or liabilities of defenclcmts.
We are satisfied that the 11th section of the act of November 10, 1828, does not apply to defendants who reside “ out of thé country,” that is out of the State of Florida, when the cause of action accrues. “ Nemoval out of the country, or out of the county where he or they do or shall ycside when sucli cause of action accrued,” means removal out of the State of Florida or county in said State where he or they do or shall reside when such cause of action accrued. It is not probable that our Legislature intended to deprive those of our citizens who have emigrated hither of the privilege of protecting themselves by our statutes against the stale demands of non-resident plaintiffs which accrued abroad, after a great lapse of time, when all their evidence of payment may be lost or destroyed.
Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed, with costs.
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Van Deren v. Lory, 87 Fla. 422 (Fla. 1924)…n the main opinion may without reference to Chapter 3900 fairly be construed to extend to causes of action that accrue out of the State and to defendants who had not resided in this State when the foreign cause of action accrued (Hargis v. Haviland, 9 Fla. 15), certainly the quoted qualifying provision of Section 14, Chapter 1869, now a part of Section 2928, Revised General Statutes, cannot be construed as applying to the subject matter of Chapter 3900, Acts of 1889, now a part of Section 2939, Revised G…
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Aviation Credit Corp. v. Batchelor, 190 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…use the appellee was not a resident of this State prior to 1965. The predecessor of the present statute was not applicable if the defendant had not been a resident of this State when the cause of action accrued. See Haviland, Clark & Co. v. Hargis, 9 Fla. 15 (1860). However, the appellant’s position is supported by the decision in Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 183 So. 335 (1937), where it was held that an action against Stratton, a citizen of New York, was not barred where the total time •of his res…