SHELDON I. KAMINSKY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sheldon Kaminsky appealed his habitual violent offender sentence for armed burglaries, challenging whether he met the statutory requirements. The court reversed the summary denial of his postconviction motion, finding that his stipulation to habitual offender status could not validate an illegal sentence, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
The court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that a defendant's stipulation cannot confer authority the law does not permit and cannot validate an illegal sentence, even when the defendant agreed to the stipulation at the plea hearing.
[1] A stipulation by a defendant regarding their qualification for habitual offender status is unavailing if the law does not permit such sentencing.
[2] A defendant cannot confer on a court the authority to impose an illegal sentence through agreement or stipulation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant cannot confer on others a right to do something the law does not permit. For example, a defendant cannot by agreement confer on a judge authority to exceed the penalties established by law. Such an illegal sentence must fail.”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle that a defendant's stipulation cannot validate an illegal sentence or confer unlawful authority on the court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKaminsky was incarcerated in 1986 and released from prison. In 1990, he was charged with violating his probation and sentenced to nineteen years for p…
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WARNER, J.
Appellant moved for postcoriviction relief, claiming that his habitual violent offender sentence for two armed burglaries was illegal because the' offenses were not committed within five years of'a prior qualifying felony or within five years of being released from prison on a sentence imposed as a result of a prior enumerated felony. The trial court summarily denied relief. We reverse for an evidentiary hearing.
At a change of plea hearing at which appellant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for'a sentence of forty years, there was much confusion about whether he qualified for habitual offender treatment. The appellánt had been incarcerated in 1986 and was released from prison. Although he had been charged in 1990 with violating his probation, and was sentenced for his prior convictions on qualifying offenses to nineteen years in prison with credit for sixteen years, he claimed to the judge that he never actually went back to prison. The-offenses for which he was habitualized were committed approximately four years later. At the plea hearing, even the prosecutor expressed some skepticism as to whether the appellant qualified for habitual violent felony offender status based upon his record. Nevertheless, the trial court wanted either the plea to be taken or the trial to continue. Given this choice, appellant stipulated that he qualified for habitual offender status, despite informing the court of facts which may show that he did not qualify.
In response to the postconviction motion, the state argues that appellant stipulated that he qualified for habitual offender status. However, in Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (Fla.1991), the court stated “[a] defendant cannot confer on others a right to do something the law does not permit. For example, a defendant cannot by agreement confer on a judge authority to exceed the penalties established by law. Such an illegal sentence must fail.” (citation omitted)/' Thus, appellant’s stipulation as to his qualification to be sentenced as a habitual offender is unavailing. We therefore reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
We affirm the trial court’s denial as to all other issues raised in the motion for postconviction relief.
STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Miller v. State, 777 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…d not exceed the statutory maximum. See Mays v. State, 717 So. 2d 515; 516 (Fla.1998). “[A] defendant cannot by agreement confer on a judge authority to exceed the penalties established by law. Such an illegal sentence must fail.” Kaminsky v. State, 732 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (Fla.1991)) (citation omitted in original). On remand, the sentences in case 91-3887 should be as follows: fifteen years in prison on counts I, III, and IV, concurrent to each…
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Williams v. State, 794 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…separate felonies, he contended, he would not have had the requisite three priors. We disagree with the State’s argument that this type of claim cannot be raised in a postconviction motion filed pursuant to rule 3.850. See, e.g., Kaminsky v. State, 732 So. 2d 443, 443-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding that a defendant’s stipulation that he qualifies for treatment as a habitual offender does not prevent him from arguing by means of a rule 3.850 motion that, in fact, his record does not so qualify him). The tria…
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