MARINA BAY HOTEL AND CLUB, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
GERRY MCCALLUM, SHERRY MCCALLUM, JAMES BOWER AND ARLENE BOWER, D/B/A DOCKS INTERNATIONAL, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1999-06-09
No. 99-0049
WARNER, FARMER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
733 So. 2d 1133 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1999) Caution
Cited by 15 cases

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Holding

The court held that an order denying a motion for summary judgment regarding a lease extension option does not determine the right to immediate possession of property, and thus is not immediately appealable under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii).


Facts & Procedural History

Appellees, lessees of dock space, sought declaratory relief concerning their option to extend the lease. The lessor (appellant) moved for summary judg…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

PER CURIAM.

Appellant is the lessor of dock space to appellees. Appellees brought this action seeking declaratory relief as to their right to exercise an option to extend the lease. The lessor appeals an order denying its motion for summary judgment, arguing that we have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii)(allowing appeals of orders determining the right to immediate possession of property).

Our mandate from the Florida Supreme Court is to narrowly interpret rule 9.130, which allows non-final appeals, so as to “restrict the number of appealable non-final orders.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla.1984); State, Department of Transp. v. Paris, 665 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Hastings v. Demming, 682 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), approved by, 694 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1997). We therefore construe rule 9.130(a)(c)(3)(ii) to allow appeals only of orders which more directly determine the immediate right to possession than the type of order entered in this case.

Appellant cites no authority which would authorize the appeal of this type of order. Even if the trial court had granted the motion for summary judgment, the order would only have determined whether the lessees had an option. It would not necessarily have ordered that the lessor get “immediate possession,” as contemplated by rule 9.130(a)(3)(c)(ii). We therefore dismiss the appeal.

WARNER, FARMER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Cotton States Mut. Ins. v. D'Alto, 879 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
    …to the kinds of orders referred to in rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. This rule is designed to reduce the number of appealable pretrial orders and to discourage piecemeal review. See Marina Bay Hotel & Club, Inc. v. McCallum, 733 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); BE & K, Inc. v. Seminole Kraft Corp., 583 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Given this objective, the courts have narrowly construed the scope of the rule so that it applies only to the orders it identifies as appealable orders. S…
  • Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Adolfo Perez, 988 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
    …id and of no legal effect. An appeal from that order was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the order did not “directly determine the immediate right to possession of property.” Id. Similarly, in Marina Bay Hotel and Club, Inc. v. McCallum, 733 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the appellee was a lessee seeking a declaration that it had a valid option to extend a lease. The appellant/lessor moved for summary judgment, the motion was denied, and the lessor sought to appeal that order. The lessor argued…
  • Profile Invs., Inc. v. DELTA Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 957 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
    …he lower tribunal on December 14, 2006, is not appealable as a nonfinal order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii). See Cooksey v. Linton, 924 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Marina Bay Hotel and Club, Inc. v. McCollum, 733 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Although the nonfinal order on appeal determined that the appellant’s tax deed is invalid and of no legal effect, this order does not directly determine the immediate right to possession of property. Therefore, this Court lacks…

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