ELSIE V. ENTZMINGER, APPELLANT,
v.
J. BRUCE THORNBERRY AND PAMELA M. THORNBERRY, APPELLEES
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Elsie Entzminger appeals a trial court order that canceled a portion of an express written easement over property owned by the Thornberrys. The appellate court reversed, holding that a clear and unambiguous easement grant is permanent and can only be modified by mutual consent, and the Thornberrys had no right to obstruct Entzminger's use of the easement.
Yes. The trial court erred by canceling the easement. An easement created by express grant without reservation or restriction is permanent and can only be changed with mutual consent of both estates' owners. The clear and unambiguous easement grant gave the Thornberrys no right to place obstructions preventing full use by the dominant estate owner.
[1] An express written easement, created without reservation or restriction, is permanent and can only be modified with the mutual consent of the dominant and servient estate…
[2] The owner of a servient estate cannot obstruct or interfere with the full use of an express, unambiguous easement granted for ingress and egress.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An easement created by express grant without reservation or restriction is permanent and can only be changed with mutual consent of the owners of the dominant and servient estates.”
Establishes the core legal principle that express easements cannot be unilaterally modified.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1991, Entzminger acquired property with a recorded quit-claim deed granting a 43.75-foot wide easement over the adjacent northern property for ingr…
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[*1115] SALCINES, Judge.
Elsie Entzminger appeals the trial court's order canceling a portion of an express written easement. The trial court erred when it did not uphold the clear and unambiguous terms of the grant of easement. Accordingly, the order is reversed.
The quit-claim deed which encompasses the property upon which Entzminger’s home has been constructed and which grants the easement in question was recorded in the public records of Polk County in 1991. The deed includes a 43.75-foot wide easement over the property immediately to the north of and abutting Entz-minger’s dominant estate. The easement was designated for the purpose of ingress and egress. In 1993, J. Bruce Thornberry and Pamela M. Thornberry purchased the property to the north of Entzminger’s which included the land which was subject to the easement (the servient estate). The legal description within the warranty deed conveying the property to the Thornberrys expressly includes Entzminger’s easement.
Approximately three years later, the Thornberrys began placing obstructions such as wooden barriers, posts, and barbed wire across and within the easement. Entzminger’s requests to the Thornberrys to remove these obstructions were to no avail. Thereafter, Entzminger filed a complaint for permanent injunctive relief against the Thornberrys for interfering with her use of the easement. At the permanent injunction hearing, the trial judge repeatedly stated that the language describing the easement in the deeds was not ambiguous. In spite of this determination, the court canceled a portion of the easement.
An easement created by express grant without reservation or restriction is permanent and can only be changed with mutual consent of the owners of the dominant and servient estates. See Fields v. Nichols, 482 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Fla. Power Corp. v. Hicks, 156 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). Due to the fact that the grant of the easement is clear and unambiguous, the owner of the ser-vient estate had no right to place obstructions across or within the easement to prevent the full use of the easement by the dominant estate owner. See Richardson v. Jackson, 667 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The Thornberrys’ reliance upon Hoff v. Scott, 453 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), to support their position that the cancellation of a portion of the easement was proper, is misplaced. In fact, Hoff supports Entzminger’s right to use the easement without interference. See also White Sands, Inc. v. Sea Club V Condominium Ass’n, 581 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
The order of the trial court is reversed. On remand the trial court shall grant in-junctive relief to Entzminger for the full use of the entire easement in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
BLUE, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Blinn v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 189 So. 3d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…hing the original easement. FP & L pointed to case law holding that amendment of an easement created by express grant without restriction or reservation, requires the consent of both the easement and land owners. See, e.g., Entzminger v. Thornberry, 734 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Ford v. Miller, 506 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Indeed, this law appears to be applicable, and the trial court apparently relied on it to determine that FP & L had a utility easement. However, the fact that the cour…
Authorities Cited
- Hoff v. Scott, 453 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Fla. Power Corp. v. Tyrus Eugene Hicks and Clara Jeanette Hicks, 156 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Richardson v. Jackson, 667 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Tanning Research Labs., Inc. v. DON Suntan Corp., 482 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Fields v. Hurley Nichols, 482 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- White Sands, Inc. v. SEA Club V. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 581 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)