STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JASON LITTON, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's ruling that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act did not apply to a defendant who burglarized an unoccupied dwelling. The appellate court reversed, holding that burglary of a dwelling—occupied or unoccupied—triggers the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Act, and remanded for the defendant to be advised of the consequences and given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
Burglary of a dwelling, whether occupied or unoccupied, qualifies as an enumerated offense under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. The trial court's sentence was reversed because the defendant was not adequately advised of the statutory consequences before entering his guilty plea, and the case was remanded to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea if he chooses.
[1] Burglary of an unoccupied dwelling subjects a criminal defendant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act.
[2] A defendant must be afforded the opportunity to withdraw a guilty plea when the trial court inaccurately advises them of the consequences of the plea.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“burglary of a dwelling, occupied or unoccupied, subjects a criminal defendant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act”
Establishes the court's holding that the Act applies regardless of whether the burglarized dwelling was occupied or unoccupied
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJason Litton pleaded guilty to burglary of a dwelling and dealing in stolen property. The burglary involved an unoccupied dwelling. Prior to accepting…
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PER CURIAM.
In this case, prior to accepting Jason Litton’s plea of guilty to the charged offenses of burglary of a dwelling and dealing in stolen property, the trial court was called upon to consider whether the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997),1 applied to Litton as he had burglarized an unoccupied dwelling. The trial court ruled that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling was not one of the enumerated offenses and, thus, that the statute did not apply to Litton. The State appealed.
Subsequent to the trial court’s ruling, we rejected such a construction of the statute, finding that burglary of a dwelling, occupied or unoccupied, subjects a criminal defendant to the Prison Releasee Reoffen-der Act. See Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Accordingly, we reverse the sentence imposed.
Because the trial court ruled upon application of the statute prior to the plea colloquy, Litton was not adequately or accurately advised of the consequences of his guilty plea. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.172(c)(1). Thus, we remand this case to providé Litton the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WARNER, STEVENSON and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. . The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act provides in pertinent part:
(8)(a)l. "Prison releasee reoffender" means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit:
q. Burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling; or within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections'or a private vendor. 2. If the state attorney determines that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in subparagraph 1., the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender. Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows:
a. For a felony punishable by life, by a term of imprisonment for life;
b. For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment of 30 years;
c. For a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment of 15 years; and d. For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment of 5 years.
(b) A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Any person sentenced under (a) must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence.
§ 775.082(8)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)(emphasis added). 1998 amendments to section 775.082 have caused renumbering of the statute and the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act now appears at subsection (9) of the statute. See § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998).
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State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001)…d must be sentenced as follows: ... c. For a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment of 15 years; ... . The Fourth District receded from its own prior opinions in Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); State v. Litton, 736 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); and Wallace v. State, 738 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). . Included among the list of offenses eligible for sentencing under the PRR is armed burglary, i.e., burglary with a dangerous weapon or explosive. . Section 810.011, F…
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State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…Department of Corrections instead of the mandatory sentence of fifteen years required under the PRR. We acknowledge that our decision is in conflict with this court’s opinions in Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), State v. Litton, 736 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Wallace v. State, 738 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and to the extent that they are in conflict, we hereby recede from those decisions. We further note and acknowledge that we are in conflict with the Second District Court…
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Ennio Foresta v. State, 751 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…pinion, held that “the PRR section 775.082(8)(a)(l)(q) does not apply to burglary of an unoccupied dwelling.” Id. at 1216. The Huggins court expressly receded from its holdings in Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), State v. Litton, 736 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Wallace v. State, 738 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and acknowledged conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal on this issue. We agree with the Second District Court of Appeal and hold that the Prison Releasee Re…
Authorities Cited
- McKinley Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)