LEEWINE N. HUNTER, APPELLANT,
v.
VIRGINIA LOVELACE HUNTER, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the trial court denied the husband's motion for relief from a final judgment of dissolution, finding the wife satisfied Florida's residency requirement despite the husband's claim she was absent from the state during the critical six-month period. The appellate court affirmed, holding that substantial competent evidence supported the trial court's residency findings.
The trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction because competent substantial evidence supported its finding that the appellee satisfied Florida's residency requirement. A continuous presence in the state is not required for the entire six-month period preceding the filing of a dissolution petition; corroborative evidence such as a Florida driver's license and voter registration are sufficient.
[1] A trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a dissolution proceeding if a party satisfies the residency requirement of section 61.021, Florida Statutes.
[2] A Florida driver's license, voter registration card, or third-party testimony may corroborate an allegation that a party satisfies the residency requirement for dissoluti…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the evidence of the wife's residency is conflicting, competent substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings regarding the appellee's residency.”
Establishes the standard of review: the appellate court will not overturn factual findings supported by competent substantial evidence, even if evidence is conflicting.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA final judgment of dissolution incorporating a marital settlement agreement was entered on July 7, 1997, with no appeal taken at that time. The wife …
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PER CURIAM.
Leewine N. Hunter challenges an order denying his motion for relief from a final judgment of dissolution. Appellant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this dissolution proceeding because the appellee, Virginia Lovelace Hunter, was not a Florida resident for the six-month period prior to the filing of the dissolution petition. We affirm.
The final judgment of dissolution, which incorporated the marital settlement agreement of the parties, was entered on July 7, 1997, and no appeal was taken. Appellant subsequently sought relief from the final judgment of dissolution on two grounds: (i) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding because the appellee had been absent from the State of Florida during the six months prior to filing the petition and, thus, did not satisfy the residency requirement of section 61.021, Florida Statutes (1997), and (ii) that the appellee filed a fraudulent financial affidavit. In the order on appeal, the trial court found that the appellee had satisfied the statutory residency requirement and that the appellant’s allegations of fraud were not sufficiently pled. The appellant does not challenge the lower court’s finding as to his claim of fraud.
Although the evidence of the wife’s residency is conflicting, competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings regarding the appellee’s residency. As noted in the order denying relief from the final judgment, the appellee “maintained corroborative evidence of her Florida residency in the form of a driver’s license and [Florida] voter registration [card].” Pursuant to section 61.052(2), Florida Statutes (1997), an allegation that a party satisfies the residency requirement of section 61.021 may be corroborated by a Florida driver’s license, voter registration card, or third party testimony. It is well-established that a continuous presence in the state is not required for the entire six months preceding the filing of a petition for a dissolution of marriage. See Beaucamp v. Beaucamp, 508 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA1987).
Accordingly, the order under review is AFFIRMED.
ALLEN, WEBSTER AND VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.
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Rowland v. Debrah Rae Rowland, 868 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ough production of a Florida voter’s registration card, a Florida driver’s license, or third-party testimony. Furthermore, a continuous presence dur [*611] ing the entire six-month period before filing the petition is not required. Hunter v. Hunter, 736 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). We conclude that the Wife’s testimony and the production of the Wife’s Florida driver’s license provided competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings as to the Wife’s residency and the court’s jurisdicti…
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Snyder v. McLEOD, 971 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).2 Additionally, section 61.052(2) provides that proof of a valid Florida driver’s license and voter registration may be used to corroborate the Florida residency requirement in section 61.021. See also Hunter v. Hunter, 736 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). As explained in Keveloh v. Carter, 699 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997): A person may have several temporary local residences but can have only one legal residence. A legal residence or “domicile” is the place where a person has…
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Meisman v. Alvaro "al" Hernandez, 353 So. 3d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)…ence of domicile includes, inter alia: income and other tax returns; homestead exemptions; voting registration; driver's license; place of business affairs; use of 'residence'; and number of days in the state." (citation omitted)); Hunter v. Hunter, 736 So. 2d 801, 801-02 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reasoning that residence requirement for purposes of dissolution of marriage petition could be corroborated by driver's license or voter registration information). Although Mr. Hernandez was not spending the night at th…
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- Georg Arthur Josef Maria Beaucamp v. Beaucamp, 508 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)