H. B. CARTER, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF CARTER LUMBER YARD, APPELLENT,
v.
P. F. GEARTY AND LAURA C. GEARTY, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES

Fla. | 1925-07-22
West, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell and Brown, J. J., concur.
90 Fla. 170 Florida Supreme Court (1925) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Carter sought to enforce a statutory mechanic's lien against real property owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties for lumber and building materials supplied in 1921-1922. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint because the lien claim was not filed within the statutory twelve-month period required by law.


Holding

The court affirmed the dismissal because the suit was barred by the statutory twelve-month limitation period. Under Florida law, a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien must be brought within twelve months from the furnishing of materials when no notice of lien is recorded, and this deadline had expired before the complaint was filed.


Key Quotes

“the time within which such a lien could be enforced, is limited by Section 3530, Revised General Statutes, 1920”

Establishes that statutory liens for building materials are subject to a time limitation under Florida law.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Carter furnished building materials to the Geartys between May 25, 1921, and March 1, 1922, for repair or construction on real property owned by the c…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Strum J.

Strum J.

Appellant, as complainant below brought his bill in chancery against appellees, who are alleged to be husband and wife, seeking to have declared upon and enforced against the real property therein described a statutory lien of complainant for lumber and other building materials furnished by complainant directly to the defendants and used by the latter to repair or construct a house upon said lands.

The bill, in effect, alleges that the said real property, at the time of the furnishing of the materials and at the time of the filing of the bill of complaint, was owned and held by the defendants as husband and wife by the entireties; that the defendants purchased and used said building materials jointly and that the indebtedness arising on account of the purchase thereof was joint. The materials were ‘ ‘ purchased, ’ ’ so the bill alleges, ‘ ‘ on and between the dates of May 25th, 1921, and March 1st, 1922.” The bill further alleges that the materials were furnished to said defendants, but is silent as to the dates upon which the materials were so furnished. A statement of account attached to the bill of complaint, and expressly made a part thereof, discloses, however, that the last charge against the defendants was made on October 14, 1921, for building material, in amount of $8.00. The fact that the last material was furnished on October 14, 1921, is further supported by the claim in the bill of complaint for interest from that date. The bill of complaint was filed on March 26, 1923.

The suit purports to be brought solely under the provisions of Chapter V, Section 3495, et seq., Revised General Statutes, 1920, relating to the acquisition and enforcement of statutory liens. No question as to the enforcement of an indebtedness of any nature against the separate statutory property of a married woman is involved in this suit.

The Chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill and dismissed the same.

The bill of complaint is drawn upon the theory that, under the circumstances therein alleged, real property owned and held by husband and wife by the entireties may be subject to a statutory lien for building materials furnished upon the joint order of husband and wife, or with the knowledge and acquiescence of both spouses, for the construction or repair of a building upon such real property. Assuming, but not deciding, the correctness of that theory, the time within which such a lien could be enforced, is limited by Section 3530, Revised General Statutes, 1920. There appears to have been no record of a notice of the lien claimed by complainant, and suit to enforce the same must therefore be brought within twelve months from the furnishing of the materials. Whether the last materials were furnished on October 14, 1921, or on March 1st, 1922, the bill of complaint was not filed until March 26, 1923, more than twelve months from the latter date. The Chancellor therefore was correct in his order sustaining the demurrer (See Erickson v. Insurance Co. of North America, 66 Fla. 154, 63 South. Rep. 716), and since the bill of complaint, under the circumstances, was not susceptible of successful amendment, there was no error in dismissing the bill without giving complainant an opportunity to amend. Decree affirmed.

West, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell and Brown, J. J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Ervin F. Parker v. Gamble, 96 Fla. 343 (Fla. 1928)
    …duly filed, the statute containing no provision that the lien shall be acquired “by the performance of the labor or the furnishing of the materials” as in section 3517 Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920, sec. 5380 Compiled General Laws 1927. In Carter v. Gearty, 90 Fla. 170, 105 So. R. 329 the cause of action was prior to the enactment of Ch. 9296 supra. Affirmed. Terrell and Bueord, J. J., concur. Ellis, C. J. and Strum and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion' and judgment.…
  • Alsheimer v. Palmer, 105 Fla. 224 (Fla. 1932)
    …within twelve months after the notice of lien was filed. This Court by memorandum order, without opinion, affirmed the decree. In the case of Booker & Co. vs. Leon H. Watson, Inc., 96 Fla. 671, 119 Sou. 104, and 123 Sou. 837; and Carter vs. Gearty, 90 Fla. 170, 105 Sou. 329, the question here involved was not presented, though in the ease of Booker & Co. vs. Leon H. Watson, Inc., it was inferentially held that the suit could be brought within twelve months after the filing and recording of the lien, if li…
  • Weaver-Loughridge Lumber Co. v. Hobson, 99 Fla. 1183 (Fla. 1930)
    …expires by limitation at the time fixed by statute and proceedings cannot, after the expiration of such time be brought to enforce the same. Eddins v. Tweddle, 35 Fla. 107, 17 So. R. 66; Hume v. Simmons, 34 Fla. 584, 16 So. R. 552; Carter v. Gearty, 90 Fla. 170, 105 So. R. 329; Booker & Co. v. Leon H. Watson, Inc., supra; Crandall’s Florida Common Law Practice, 573, 20 A. & E. Enc. Law 2d Ed. 520; 18 R. C. L. 981. Suit was not brought by Weaver-Loughridge Lumber Company within the time fixed by statute.…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw