STEVEN PARAVE, APPELLANT,
v.
TRI COUNTY SECURITY, INC. AND HUMANA WORKERS' COMPENSATION SERVICES, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1999-07-29
No. 98-2670
ALLEN and KAHN, JJ., CONCUR., JOANOS, J., DISSENTS WITH WRITTEN OPINION.
737 So. 2d 637 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1999) Caution
Cited by 10 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In the workers’ compensation order under review, the claimant was awarded twenty-four hour per day nonprofessional attendant care. He asserts on appeal that the judge of compensation claims erred, however, in ruling that the claimant’s fiancee could not be compensated for being on call during the eight hours per night in which he slept. In light of the particular facts of this case, including the claimant’s specific needs during his hours of sleep, the judge of compensation claims was justified in finding that the fiancee’s activities during these hours did not go beyond her normal household activities, and therefore did not qualify as compensable nonprofessional attendant care. The order is accordingly affirmed.

ALLEN and KAHN, JJ., CONCUR. JOANOS, J., DISSENTS WITH WRITTEN OPINION.

Dissent
JOANOS, J.,

JOANOS, J.,

dissenting.

To me, the case law directs compensation to be paid in this case for twenty-four hour a day “on call” or “surveillance” attendant care provided by claimant’s fiancee, where the judge of compensation claims has found that claimant is in need of such care. See Builders Square v. Drake, 557 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); King Lumber Co. v. Bloomfield, 560 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Collura v. Multi Line Can Company, 598 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
    …. We have long held that the Legislature has the authority to enact mandatory sentences. See O’Donnell v. State, 326 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1975); Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1975). But, as Judge Sharp pointed out in her dissent in Lookadoo v. State, 737 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (Sharp, J., dissenting), and as the defendants argue here, the minimal sentencing discretion inherent in this statute is placed in the hands of the state attorneys and the victims. The courts have been totally excluded from exerc…
    1 / 2
  • Vucinich v. State, 776 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
    …itutes cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree. Given Vuci-nich’s long criminal record, he is just the type of person the habitual offender statute contemplates. See Collier v. State, 649 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); See also Lookadoo v. State, 737 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)(Sharp, J., dissenting). AFFIRMED. W. SHARP, and PETERSON, JJ., concur. . Prior to that amendment the Florida Supreme Court held that habitualization under that statute was legal. Gayman v. State, 616 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1993).…
  • Turner v. State, 745 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
    …SEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? AFFIRMED. KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ„ concur. . We infer from the dissent in Lookadoo v. State, 737 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1999)(Sharp, W., J., dissenting), that this argument was raised and rejected in that case. . Subparagraph (d)l. to section 775.082(8), provides: (d) 1. It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from pris…

Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw