KELVIN D. WHITE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kelvin White was charged with firearm and marijuana possession after a traffic stop that yielded drugs and a gun from his vehicle. The Florida Court of Appeal reversed his convictions, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop White's car, making the search and seizure unconstitutional.
The court held that Officer Schmidt lacked the requisite well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support the traffic stop. The totality of circumstances—including old robberies in the area, White's presence near businesses at 3:30 a.m., and his departure from the area—did not create reasonable suspicion that White had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
[1] An investigatory stop of a vehicle is invalid if it is not predicated on a founded or reasonable suspicion that the occupants have committed, are committing, or are about…
[2] An automobile parked in a business area after hours, which departs upon a police cruiser's approach, does not, in itself, create a founded or reasonable suspicion of crim…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Officer Schmidt did not have the requisite "well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity" necessary to support a traffic stop.”
Establishes the legal standard required for an investigatory stop and concludes the officer failed to meet it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSecurity officers at a marina in St. Petersburg observed White's car driving back and forth near a closed marina at 3:30 a.m., then turning into an ad…
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NORTHCUTT, Acting Chief Judge.
The State charged Kelvin White with possession of a firearm1 and possession of marijuana.2 White moved to suppress the gun and the drugs, which were discovered when law enforcement officers stopped his car. The circuit court denied his motion, and he pleaded no contest to the charges, reserving the right to appeal his disposi-tive motion to suppress. We reverse.
At the hearing on White’s motion to suppress, two private security officers testified that they were working in the area surrounding Maximo Marina in St. Peters-burg on the night White was arrested. At about 3:30 a.m., they noticed a car driving back and forth in front of the marina, which was closed at the time. The car then turned into the parking lot of an adjacent motel, which was open for business. At a second hearing on the motion, the motel’s security guard testified that he also observed the car, which was moving, but had its lights turned off. The car pulled into a parking space. When this security guard approached the car, one of the occupants shouted profanities at him. While the occupant’s remarks were not threatening, the security guard felt “a little bit” threatened. The car then drove away.
The motel’s security guard contacted the St. Petersburg police department, and Officer Marian Schmidt arrived to investigate. She was speaking with the security guards when the suspicious car drove by on a public street next to the motel and marina property. Officer Schmidt pursued the car and stopped it. She smelled marijuana, placed White and his passenger in her patrol car, and discovered marijuana cigarettes in the car’s ashtray and a gun on the passenger-side front floorboard. White was arrested and charged with the previously-mentioned crimes.
Officer Schmidt did not have the requisite “well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity” necessary to support a traffic stop. See Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). To justify an investigatory stop, law enforcement must have a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. See id,.; see also § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). The testimony at the suppression hearing showed that businesses in the area had been robbed at some indeterminate time in the past. But no recent crime had occurred, so the stop could not be justified by a suspicion that White or his passenger were the perpetrators. Cf. Grant v. State, 718 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (upholding a stop where a car was driving without its headlights, up and down a small street where a burglary had occurred mere hours earlier). None of White’s activities described at the hearing could give rise to a belief that he was actually committing a crime. Any suspicion that he was about to commit one was dissipated when he drove away from the businesses, and no evidence showed that White’s car was returning to the business area when the guards spotted it driving down a public street.
The totality of the circumstances in this case did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The officer’s stop of White’s car was improper, and all evidence seized as a result of the stop should have been suppressed. We reverse White’s convictions, and we remand with directions to discharge him.
Reversed and remanded.
GREEN and SALCINES, JJ., Concur. . § 790.23, Fla. Stat. (1995).
. § 893.13, Fla. Stat. (1995).
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Ippolito v. State, 789 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…State v. Levin, 452 So. 2d 562 (Fla.l984)(adopting 449 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and holding that simply being out on the street during late and unusual hours in area where crimes have been committed is insufficient for a stop); White v. State, 737 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(holding that police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle where businesses in the area had been robbed in the past, and defendant was driving back and forth in front of clos…
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Nitika Griffin v. State, 800 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…was not observed attempting to enter any room. This conduct in and of itself does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, he returned to his car and was about to drive away when stopped by the officer. As in White v. State, 737 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), “[a]ny suspicion that he was about to commit [a crime] was dissipated when he drove away.” The officers approached appellant to determine whether he was a guest or a visitor. They were entitled to ask him a few questions t…
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State v. White, 742 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…. Mr. White appealed case number 98-02308 after the Slate filed these appeals. Appellate counsel was appointed to represent him, as appellant, and he has already received a favorable opinion in that case. See White v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1284, 737 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA1999). Meanwhile, no answer brief has yet been filed in this case. .Although this case involves appointed counsel for an indigent defendant, we observe that trial counsel for any defendant is served with the State’s notice of appeal. Th…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Grant v. State, 718 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)