WANDA AND ERIC TEAT, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF APALACHICOLA, APPELLEE
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The court held that property bounded by the shore of a navigable waterway extends to the ordinary high water mark, granting riparian rights. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the appellants did not possess such rights.
[1] Property bounded by the shore of a tidal and navigable waterway extends to the ordinary high water mark for the purpose of possessing riparian rights.
[2] Ownership of property extending to the shore of a navigable waterway grants riparian rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants own land along the bank of Huckleberry Creek, a tidal and navigable waterway, with their deed conveying land to the bank. The trial court d…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants, Wanda and Eric Teat, appeal a final order in which the trial court found that they did not possess riparian rights and denied appellants’ claims for damages and injunctive relief for negligence, trespass, and inverse condemnation. Because we find that appellants did possess riparian rights, we reverse.
Appellants live along the banks of Huckleberry Creek, a tidal and navigable waterway, and their deed conveys land that runs to the bank of this creek. The trial court held that, under Axline v. Shaw, 35 Fla. 305, 17 So. 411 (1895), appellants did not possess riparian rights because their property was bounded by land, not water. The issue in Axline was whether a boundary upon the shore of a lake was the equivalent to a boundary upon the lake itself. The court defined “shore” as the area of land that falls between the ordinary low and high water lines. At that time, the State of Florida held title to the submerged lands of navigable waters up to the low water line. Currently, the State’s ownership extends up to the ordinary high water mark of navigable waterways, and an individual must own property down to the ordinary high water mark in order to possess riparian rights. See §§ 253.12, 253.1221, and 253.141, Florida Statutes (1997).
We hold that, under the definition of “shore” in Axline, property that extends to the shore extends to the ordinary high water mark, and riparian rights are attached to that property. Under the facts of this case, the banks of Huckleberry Creek are the equivalent of a shore. Therefore, appellants do possess riparian rights.
Because the trial court addressed the issue of damages with the understanding that appellants did not possess riparian rights, we REVERSE and REMAND this case to the trial court to determine whether there was a taking of or damage to appellants’ riparian rights, and, if so, what damages or other relief is appropriate based on the evidence adduced at trial. On all other grounds, we AFFIRM.
BOOTH, MINER and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.
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Save OUR Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't OF Env't Prot. (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people ....”) (emphasis added); Teat v. City of Apalachicola, 738 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (stating that “[currently, the State’s ownership extends up to the ordinary high water mark of navigable waterways, and an individual must own property down to the ordinary high water mark in order to possess riparian rights…
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Colgan v. Shadow Point (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…ce of title to or lease of the riparian land entitles the grantee to the riparian rights running therewith whether or not mentioned in the deed or lease of the upland. § 253.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added); Teat v. City of Apalachicola, 738 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (stating that “an individual must own 5 property down to the ordinary high water mark in order to possess riparian rights”). Therefore, there must be some theory in the record that supports a finding that Shadow Point ha…
Authorities Cited
- Axline v. Shaw, 35 Fla. 305 (Fla. 1895)