SANDRA BAUMSTEIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF KAREN BAUMSTEIN, APPELLANT,
v.
SUNRISE COMMUNITY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND DR. LUCREZIA AQUINO, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A private cause of action may be asserted under section 393.13, Florida Statutes, for violations of the rights of persons who are developmentally disabled.
[1] A private cause of action may be asserted under section 393.13, Florida Statutes, for violations of the rights of persons who are developmentally disabled.
[2] Section 393.13(5), Florida Statutes, clearly expresses the legislature's intent to create civil liability for damages arising from violations of the rights of development…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff, as personal representative for a developmentally disabled adult resident of a private facility, sued the facility and her physician for all…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Nonfeasance cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Sandra Baumstein, the personal representative of her late sister Karen, a developementally disabled adult who had been a resident of a private facility owned by the appellee Sunrise Community Incorporated, brought an action against Sunrise and Karen’s physician, Dr. Lucrezia Aquino, claiming damages for the defendants’ alleged violation of rights guaranteed to such patients by section 393.13, Florida Statutes (1993), the “Bill of Rights of Persons Who are Developmentally Disabled.” The trial judge dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that no private cause of action may be asserted under the act. We reverse.
There is no question that the primary, perhaps the only, issue pertinent to the question of whether a private cause of action may be based upon the breach of a statute is whether the legislature intended that to be the case. Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994); see Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1999)[24 FLW S283, S285]. In this instance, it has clearly answered that question in the affirmative. Section 393.13(5) provides:
(5) LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS.—Any person who violates or abuses any rights or privileges of persons who are developmentally disabled provided by this act shall be liable for damages as determined by law. Any person who acts in good faith compliance with the provisions of this act shall be immune from civil or criminal liability for actions in connection with evaluation, admission, habilitative programming, education, treatment, or discharge of a client. However, this section shall not relieve any person from liability if such person is guilty of negligence, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or malfeasance, [emphasis supplied]
§ 393.13(5), Fla. Stat. (1993).
Despite the appellees’ imaginative attempts to make it mean something other than what it says, the statute could hardly be clearer. While courts have often recognized causes of action even in the absence of specific statutory language, Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 24 FLW at S283, and cases cited, we need not go nearly that far here. Because we are bound by the legislature’s clear and unambiguous expression of its own intent, see State v. Dugan, 685 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1996), we hold that civil liability for damages indeed arises from violations of Chapter 393.1 See also Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), review denied, 717 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1998); Beverly Enters.—Fla., Inc. v. Spilman, 661 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), review denied, 668 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1996).
For this reason, the judgment of dismissal below is reversed and the cause remanded for further appropriate proceedings.2
. We reject the defendants' claim that Loucks v. Adair, 312 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 33 (Fla.1976), supports their position. Louclcs held only that, because of sovereign immunity, a state agency could not be liable for a violation of the Mental Health Act even though it contained a section similar to 393.13(5). (Furthermore, even on that issue, Louclcs is called into question by Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (Fla.1982).)
The appellees’ reliance on similar statutes from other jurisdictions which provide no private cause of action is also misplaced, see, e.g., Ala.Code § 38-9C-8 (1992); Iowa Code § 225C.29 (1994); Kan. Stat. § 39-1802 (1998); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981), because none contain anything like 393.13(5). (Most of the contrary cases cited by the plaintiff are likewise unhelpful because they involve elaborate provisions creating a cause of action which have no equivalent in sections 393.01, et. seq.)
. The appellees seek affirmance on statute of limitations grounds even though that was not the basis of the order below. In the circumstances, we decline even to reach the question both because the facts controlling the limitations issue do not clearly appear on the face of the complaint and should be therefore considered only in support of an affirmative defense, see Jelenc v. Draper, 678 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 629 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), and because of the rule that disputed questions should ordinarily first be considered and determined by the trial court. See City of Coral Gables v. Puiggros, 376 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). We intimate no opinion as to the merits of this or any other issue in the case.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2004)…, 301-02 (Fla.2001). Several principles of statutory interpretation guide our analysis. Whether a violation of a statute can serve as the basis for a private cause of action is a question of legislative intent. See Baumstein v. Sunrise Cmty., Inc., 738 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); see also Nettles v. State, 850 So. 2d 487, 493 (Fla.2003) (noting that legislative intent is the “polestar that guides the court’s inquiry”). Courts must determine legislative intent from the plain meaning of the statute. St…
-
Lynn R. Fassy, M.D., & Pain Med. Assocs., P.A. v. Crowley, 884 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…us to this case because the Bill of Rights created a statutory right, not mentioned in chapter 766, under section 393.13(3)(g) and a private cause of action with liability for violations under section 393.13(5). See Baumstein v. Sunrise Cmty., Inc., 738 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The Personal Representative persuaded the circuit court that a claim founded on section 393.13(3)(g) can be proved by showing a breach of a standard of care other than medical malpractice under section 766.102(1), namely, se…
-
United Auto. Ins. Co. v. A 1ST Choice Healthcare Sys., 21 So. 3d 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…xcess of that permitted under, or in violation of, subsection (5). § 627.736(4)(b). It is axiomatic that whether a private right of action exists for a violation of a statute is a matter of legislative intent. See Baumstein v. Sunrise Cmty., Inc., 738 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“There is no question that the primary, perhaps the only, issue pertinent to the question of whether a private cause of action may be based upon the breach of a statute is whether the legislature intended that to be the case…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1981)
- Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1982)
- Melendez v. Singletary, 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994)
- State v. Dugan, 685 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1996)
- Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc. v. Spilman, 661 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- State v. Fessenden, 734 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1999)
- City OF Coral Gables v. Puiggros, 376 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Jelenc v. Draper, 678 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 629 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)