PETER N. HANNA, APPELLANT,
v.
BEVERLY ENTERPRISES-FLORIDA D/B/A HARBOR BEACH CONVALESCENT HOME, APPELLEE
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A nursing home sued its guardian-resident contract's signatory for unpaid care fees. The guardian prevailed on the merits but sought attorney's fees under a prevailing-party clause and a Florida statute. The court held no contract existed between the parties to trigger the fee-shifting provision, but reversed the dismissal of the guardian's fraud counterclaim on statute of limitations grounds.
The court affirmed that no attorney's fees are recoverable because no contract existed between the parties to the litigation. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the fraud counterclaim on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the limitations period runs from discovery of the fraud, not from contract signing.
[1] A one-sided provision for prevailing party attorney's fees in a contract does not become reciprocal when the contract is found to be unenforceable, absent statutory manda…
[2] A contract must exist between the parties for a prevailing party attorney's fees provision within that contract to be enforceable.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when parties enter into a contract and litigation later ensues over that contract, attorney's fees may be recovered under a prevailing-party attorney's fee provision contained therein even though the contract is rescinded or held to be unenforceable.”
Establishes the general rule allowing attorney's fees in contract disputes, which the court distinguished as inapplicable here.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Hanna, as guardian of Esther Wagner, signed a contract with Beverly Enterprises nursing home for Wagner's care. The contract contained a pre…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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KLEIN, J.
Appellant, as the guardian of Esther Wagner, entered into a contract with appellee nursing home to provide care for Wagner. The contract provided for prevailing party attorney’s fees if the nursing home filed suit and was “a prevailing party in litigation against any party to this agreement.” The nursing home brought this action against the appellant, individually, for payments due. Appellant prevailed, because he had signed the contract only as the guardian. He claims he is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 57.105(2), Florida Statutes (1995) which makes a one-sided provision for prevailing party attorney’s fees in a contract reciprocal.
We agree that the trial court correctly refused to award fees. Katz v. Van Der Noord, 546 So. 2d 1047 (Fla.1989), on which appellant relies, is distinguishable. In Katz our supreme court held: [W]hen parties enter into a contract and litigation later ensues over that contract, attorney’s fees may be recovered under a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision contained therein even though the contract is rescinded or held to he unenforceable. The legal fictions which accompany a judgment of rescission do not change the fact that a contract did exist. It would be unjust to preclude the prevailing party to the dispute over the contract which led to its rescission from recovering the very attorney’s fees which were contemplated by that contract.
Id. at 1049 (emphasis added).
The present case is distinguishable from Katz in that in the present case no contract ever existed between these parties. This court recognized that distinction in Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. McCoy, 657 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
We do agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in dismissing his counterclaim on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant’s counterclaim against the nursing home was grounded on fraud and alleged that when appellant signed the contract it was represented to him that the nursing home would not hold him individually liable. The trial court concluded that the four-year period of limitation barred the suit, assuming that the cause of action accrued at the time the contract was signed. Appellant could not have known, however, that the nursing home made a fraudulent misrepresentation at the time the contract was signed, because it would not have been apparent until the nursing home brought this suit against him on an individual basis. The period of limitations for fraud runs from the time the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. We therefore affirm the denial of attorney’s fees, but reverse the dismissal based on the statute of limitations and remand for further proceedings on the counterclaim. We decline the nursing home’s suggestion to consider, at this point, whether a cause of action has been stated.
WARNER, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.
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The Bank OF NEW York Mellon Tr. Co., N.A. v. Fitzgerald, 215 So. 3d 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…. Weinstein Design Group, Inc., 842 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (finding that individual who was not a party to the contract cannot' recover prevailing party fees nor can such fees be assessed against him); Hanna v. Beverly Enterprises-Fla., 738 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (affirming denial of attorney’s fees under section 57.105(2)2 because no contract existed between the parties); Florida Med. Ctr., Inc. v. McCoy, 657 So. 2d 1248, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding that where trial court foun…
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Fielder v. Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 842 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…but Mr. Fielder was dismissed because he was not a party to the contract. Because Mr. Fielder was not a party to the contract, he cannot recover prevailing party’s fees nor can such fees be assessed against him. Hanna v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, 738 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Fla. Med. Ctr. v. McCoy, 657 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Stewart v. Tasnet, Inc., 718 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Mrs. Fielder argues that the trial court committed legal error in holding that she was not the prevailing…
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Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Weaver Aggregate Transp., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2011)…limitations has expired, warranting dismissal of this claim. Under Florida law, legal or equitable actions founded on fraud are subject to a four-year limitations period. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j); see also Hanna v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, 738 So.2d 424, 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Beacon claims that the limitations period began to run no later than June 16, 2006, the last day American Home provided any coverage to Weaver. Because American Home did not file its Complaint until July 22, 2010, Beacon co…
Authorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 546 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1989)
- Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. McCOY, 657 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Katz v. VAN DER Noord, 546 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1989)