FRANCINE ROSEN, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
LOUIS E. ROSEN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this family law appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed disputes over asset division in a divorce decree. The court reversed on two issues—exclusion of the wife's engagement ring from marital assets and modification of the home repair credit—while affirming the trial court's classification of other assets as marital property.
The court held that: (1) the trial court did not err in failing to provide written justification for characterizing assets as marital, as the statute does not require such explanation; (2) including the engagement ring in marital assets was error under Melvik v. Melvik; and (3) the home repair credit must be modified to limit it to one-half of actual expenditures, not a fixed amount.
[1] A trial court is not required by statute to provide written findings explaining its determination that an asset is marital or non-marital.
[2] An engagement ring is generally considered non-marital property in a dissolution of marriage action.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Contrary to the wife's contention, nothing in the statute requires the trial judge to enter written findings explaining the court's conclusion that an asset is either marital or non-marital.”
Establishes that trial courts need not provide detailed written justification for asset characterization under Florida Statutes § 61.075(3)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrancine and Louis Rosen divorced, with disputes over the characterization and distribution of marital assets. Key disputed assets included funds in a…
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PER CURIAM.
Francine Rosen raises fourteen points in her appeal from the final judgment of dissolution of her marriage; Louis Rosen cross-appeals. We reverse as to two points, affirm as to all others with the exception of the attorney’s fee issue which is not ripe for appeal, see Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), and write to address one issue we believe merits discussion.
The trial court did not err in failing to include written justification for its determination that one-half of the assets originally held in the Charles Schwab account were marital property. Section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes, requires that the trial judge, in a contested dissolution action, include specific findings of fact as to the “distribution of marital assets,” § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat., and written findings as to:
(a) Clear identification of non-marital assets and ownership interests;
(b) Identification of marital assets, including the individual valuation of significant assets, and designation of which spouse shall be entitled to each asset;
(d) Any other findings necessary to advise the parties or the reviewing court of the trial court’s rationale for the distribution of marital assets and allocation of liabilities.
§ 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. Contrary to the wife’s contention, nothing in the statute requires the trial judge to enter written findings explaining the court’s conclusion that an asset is either marital or non-marital. We find the trial court’s determination to be amply supported by competent substantial evidence; therefore, we will not disturb it on appeal.
The inclusion of the wife’s engagement ring in the parties’ marital assets was error. See Melvik v. Melvik, 669 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Neither the ring, nor the husband’s payment in exchange therefor in accordance with a separate agreement, should be included in the wife’s share of the distribution of marital property.
Finally, the treatment of the credit for repairs to the marital home failed to address the possibility that the husband may spend less than $20,000 for repairs; hence, the final judgment must be modified to limit the credit to one-half of his non-marital asset expenditure.
Accordingly, the final judgment of dissolution is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded for modification in accordance with this decision.
STONE, POLEN, and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Katharine Randall v. Randall, 56 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
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Malone v. Parry A. Malone, 929 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…ver, we reverse the distribution of an engagement ring and certain credit card debt. The trial court considered the value of the engagement ring given to the former wife prior to the marriage as a marital asset; this was error. See Rosen v. Rosen, 738 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Greenberg v. Greenberg, 698 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Melvik v. Melvik, 669 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Furthermore, the trial court included as a marital liability credit card debt incurred by the former husband on hi…
Authorities Cited
- Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Melvik v. Melvik, 669 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)