JOSEPH WENDELL REDD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1999-06-25
No. 99-935
DAUKSCH, COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
738 So. 2d 978 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1999) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that sentences exceeding the statutory maximum for a life felony, even if within the general statutory maximum, are illegal and subject to post-conviction relief.


Facts & Procedural History

Joseph Wendell Redd appealed an order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing his 45-year sentences for life felonies exceeded the …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Joseph Wendell Redd appeals an order denying his motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) to correct an illegal sentence. Only one of the four grounds raised has merit.

In considering Redd’s motion, the trial court acknowledged that at the time Redd was sentenced, it was improper to impose a habitual sentence for a life felony. The court, nonetheless, concluded that Redd was not entitled to relief because improper habitualization for a life felony is not subject to a post-conviction remedy as long as the sentence imposed is within the statutory maximum for the offense. See Carter v. State, 704 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).

However, the 45 year sentences imposed in the instant case exceeded the statutory maximum. The statutory maximum for a life felony at the time Redd committed his offenses in 1989 was either life or a term of years not exceeding 40 years. Thus, appellant’s sentences of 45 years for his life felonies are vacated. On remand, we direct the trial court to determine which of Redd’s offenses constituted life felonies committed during the time the 40 year maximum applied and to re-sentence accordingly. We further note that the attachments to the court’s order did not include copies of the written judgments and sentences as required. See Bunch v. State, 622 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED.

DAUKSCH, COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Miranda v. State, 832 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …. See §§ 782.04(2), 775.087(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). At that time the penalty for a life felony was life imprisonment or a term of years not exceeding forty. Id. § 775.082(3)(a); Ferguson v. State, 804 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Redd v. State, 738 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Since the fifty year term exceeds the legal maximum, the sentence on the second degree murder count must be reduced from fifty years to forty years. The defendant need not be present. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and rem…

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