PAMELA KARPOVICH, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE KARPOVICH, APPELLEE
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In a divorce appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decisions regarding alimony and marital debt distribution but reversed on the issue of attorney's fees, finding the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award the former wife any portion of her attorney's fees given the significant disparity in the parties' financial resources.
The court affirmed the trial court's decisions regarding alimony awards and debt allocation but reversed and remanded the attorney's fees issue, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award Pamela some portion of her attorney's fees given the substantial disparity in the parties' financial earning abilities and Pamela's lack of liquid assets.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to award a portion of attorney's fees to a party with a significantly lower income and no liquid assets when the other part…
[2] A party should not be required to liquidate marital assets to pay attorney's fees.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In view of the unequal financial earning abilities of the parties, the former husband should have been required to pay some or all of Pamela's attorney's fees.”
Establishes the legal standard that a significant disparity in financial resources between spouses creates an obligation to award attorney's fees.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePamela and George Karpovich divorced after a 19-year marriage. George's gross monthly income was $4,333, while Pamela's was $1,400. Pamela was awarded…
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The former wife, Pamela Karpovich, appeals from a final judgment which dissolved her marriage to George Karpovich. Pamela argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award her permanent alimony as opposed to approximately two years of rehabilitative alimony; that the award of lump sum alimony to her (George’s interest in a lot worth $25,000 to $30,000) was insufficient; that the court inequitably assigned marital debt to the parties; and that the trial court erred in failing to award her some portion of her attorney’s fees and costs. Based on the statement of the evidence submitted by the parties and the findings of the trial court, we find no abuse of discretion with regard to the first three points. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
However, we think the trial court erred in not awarding Pamela some portion or all of her attorney’s fees. The former husband has almost triple the former wife’s income. His gross income per month was $4,333, and hers was $1,400. Neither has any assets other than their automobiles and personal property. The former wife was left with debts of $19,070 and the former husband had $14,500. The former wife was awarded an unimproved lot as lump sum alimony, “in full recognition of the duration of the marriage (19 years) and the unequal income earning abilities of the parties.” However, the former wife was required to pledge the lot she was awarded as lump sum alimony, for appellate attorney fees. In view of the unequal financial earning abilities of the parties, the former husband should have been required to pay some or all of Pamela’s attorney’s fees. See Thrift v. Thrift, 632 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (given the significant disparity in the financial resources of the parties, it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to require the husband to pay at least some portion of the wife’s attorney’s fees); Akers v. Akers, 518 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (trial court abused its discretion in awarding only a small portion of attorney’s fees to wife where former husband had superior ability to pay attorney’s fees while wife had no liquid assets and very modest income); Nichols v. Nichols, 418 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (wife was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees where she had no liquid assets and very modest income beyond alimony and child support and husband had superior ability to pay attorney’s fees). The former wife should not be required to liquidate marital assets to pay attorney’s fees. Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED to set attorney fees award.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
DAUKSCH, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in all except the award of fees. I do not believe the denial of an award of attorney’s fees rises to the level required to reverse the decision, given our standard of review and the discretion residing in the trial court. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
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Kelly v. Kelly, 925 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…tyle. See Murray v. Murray, 826 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). In reviewing an award of fees or lack of one, the appellate court uses the abuse of discretion standard. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Karpovich v. Karpovich, 739 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). In this case, we conclude that the trial court breached its discretion in not granting Laurie all or most of the fees and costs expended by her attorney. See Batson v. Batson, 821 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Blakistone v. B…
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Glasgow v. Wolfe, 873 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…lee/Cross-Appellant’s attorney’s fees, we reverse and remand for the trial court to make appropriate findings to explain its ruling on the motion for attorney’s fees. See Davies v. Turner, 802 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Karpovich v. Karpovich, 739 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Raehn v. Raehn, 557 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2001), authorizes an award of attorney’s fees, suit money, and costs “after con…
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Dybalski v. Dybalski, 108 So. 3d 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…nse is raised mainly to frustrate or stall); and the existence and course of prior or pending litigation. Id. This Court reviews a fee award for an abuse of discretion. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Karpovich v. Karpovich, 739 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Generally, it is an abuse of discretion to award attorney’s fees if the dissolution decree leaves both parties in equal financial positions. Rashid v. Rashid, 35 So. 3d 992, 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). However, as this Court expla…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Nichols v. Nichols, 418 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Akers v. Akers, 518 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- In re the Marriage of Judith Thrift v. Thrift, 632 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)