JULIE LYNN HUML, APPELLANT,
v.
ALAN BRENT COLLINS, APPELLEE
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A trial court always possesses inherent jurisdiction to enforce its prior orders, regardless of whether jurisdiction was expressly reserved.
The former wife sought to enforce a provision of a final judgment requiring the former husband to pay her $25,000 upon the sale of their property or b…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, former wife, appeals from an Order dismissing with prejudice her Amended Motion to Enforce the Final Judgment and Marital Settlement Agreement (“Motion to Enforce the Final Judgment”). We reverse.
Former wife seeks to enforce a provision of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage that requires that former husband pay her $25,000 upon the sale of the parties’ Key Largo property “or no later than July 1, 1997.” Because an express reservation of jurisdiction was not made in the Final Judgment of the Dissolution of Marriage, the trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter and granted former husband’s Motion to Dismiss. We disagree.
It is axiomatic that a trial court always has the inherent jurisdiction to enforce its previously entered orders. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 638 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Work v. Provine, 632 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Gutjahr v. Gutjahr, 368 So. 2d 93, 94-95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 321 So. 2d 628, 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, 221 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Coggan v. Coggan, 183 So. 2d 839, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Accordingly, we hold that it was error for the trial court to dismiss the former wife’s Motion to Enforce the Final Judgment.
Reversed.
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Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Callahan, 155 So. 3d 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…unt of any assessments owed to the Associations. Central argues that notwithstanding Damas, the trial court had inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate its post-judgment motion for assessments. In support of its argument, Central cites Huml v. Collins, 739 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), where this Court held “a trial court always has the inherent jurisdiction to enforce its previously entered orders.” Central’s reliance on Huml is misplaced; Huml is a dissolution of marriage case, and “[cjourts retain juris…
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Weaver v. Hotchkiss, 972 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…the circuit court reached the conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter. The circuit court had inherent jurisdiction to enforce the dissolution judgment. See Smilack v. Smilack, 858 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Huml v. Collins, 739 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Seng v. Seng, 590 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). We may speculate that the judge who signed the order denying Mr. Weaver’s motion was presiding in a division of the circuit court other than the family court division…
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Aurora Bank v. Cimbler, 166 So. 3d 921 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…force its previously entered orders, by virtue of our granting the Bank’s petition for writ of certiorari, no further orders remain to be enforced; there remains no further judicial labor for the trial court in this case. See, e.g., Huml v. Collins, 739 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“It is axiomatic that a trial court always has the inherent jurisdiction to enforce its previously entered orders.”).4 We, therefore, grant the Bank’s petition for writ of prohibition and prohibit the trial court from furth…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v. Buchwald, 321 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Work v. Provine, 632 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, 221 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Gatto v. Baron Props., Inc., 183 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)
- Coggan v. Coggan, 183 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Kennedy v. Kennedy, 638 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Luisa Rodriguez v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)