JIMMY DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1999-08-11
No. 99-1738
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and LEVY, JJ.
739 So. 2d 1238 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1999)

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Synopsis

Jimmy Davis appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea after one of his pending appeals resulted in a sentencing reversal. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the plea agreement only permitted withdrawal if Davis won a new trial on appeal, not merely a sentencing reversal.


Holding

No. The oral plea colloquy, which is controlling over the written sentencing order, made clear that Davis could withdraw his plea only if he won a new trial on appeal. A reversal on a sentencing issue alone did not qualify for withdrawal, regardless of the inaccurate language in the written order.


Headnotes

[1] An oral plea colloquy controls over a written sentencing order when there is a discrepancy regarding the terms of the plea agreement.

[2] A defendant is entitled to withdraw a plea if the conditions for withdrawal explicitly stated during the oral plea colloquy are met.

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Key Quotes

“If you win your other appeals, either one of them, we dump this plea. It didn't happen. And you're just right where you were with your right to fight all four cases, or it will be five, if you win one of the other appeals.”

The trial court's core explanation during the plea colloquy that withdrawal was conditioned on winning appeals, not merely on sentencing reversals.

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Facts & Procedural History

In January 1997, Davis entered a plea bargain for multiple offenses while two other cases were on appeal. The plea bargain provided for concurrent sen…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Jimmy Davis appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm.

In January 1997 defendant-appellant Davis entered into a plea bargain whereby he was to be sentenced for multiple offenses. At the time of the plea, defendant had appeals pending in two cases that had already been tried. The plea bargain was for sentences which would be totally, or largely, concurrent with the time imposed in the two earlier cases.

In the plea colloquy the following transpired:

COURT: If you win your other appeals, either one of them, we dump this plea. It didn’t happen. And you’re just right where you were with your right to fight all four cases, or it will be five, if you win one of the other appeals.

DEFENDANT: It’s about five.

THE COURT: If you win an appeal, then you have to go to trial on that one again too.

DEFENDANT: Oh.

THE COURT: If you win the appeal, you just don’t get ojf. You still have the trial. Did you know that ?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have explained that to him.

THE COURT: Now, do you know that? If you win the appeal in either case, then this plea will be declared null. It won’t happen and you’ll be in the same place you are today. You ivon’t have any sentence to do on those cases, but you will have trials. Is that clear to you now?

DEFENDANT: Yes ma’am.

(Emphasis added).

The oral colloquy makes clear that if defendant prevailed on a pending appeal and won a right to a new trial, then defendant could withdraw his plea in the cases now before us and go to trial in those cases as well. However, the sentencing order memorializing the plea stated, incorrectly, that “Defendant may withdraw plea if either of his pending appeal sentences are reversed.”

In April 1997 this court issued its opinion in Davis v. State, 691 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), which affirmed defendant’s convictions but reversed on a sentencing issue and remanded for resentencing. See id. 1183. Because of this reversal on a sentencing issue defendant argues that he was entitled to withdraw his plea in the cases now before us.

The trial court denied relief, and we conclude that the trial court was correct. The intent was to allow defendant to withdraw the plea if he won a new trial. A reversal on a sentencing issue did not qualify. The statement that defendant could “withdraw plea if either of his pending appeal sentences are reversed” did not accurately reflect the actual agreement. The oral colloquy is controlling. See Ricks v. State, 725 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), Amador v. State, 713 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

Affirmed.


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